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Abstract 
This thesis examines Karl Barth’s understanding of what it means for Christian individuals to 
be witnesses of Jesus Christ. By analyzing the structure of Barth’s doctrine of reconciliation, 
with attention to his view of Jesus Christ as mediator, the thesis establishes the christological 
context of Barth’s concept of witness. The thesis demonstrates how Barth arrives at the 
conclusion that witness is central to the definition of Christian existence and identifies key 
features of Barth’s view of witness, namely, its theocentrism, its basis in ontology, and its 
enactment in human history. The thesis engages secondary scholarship in a critical appraisal 
of Barth’s concept of witness. The main points of criticism surround Barth’s account of 
human reality, action, and self-understanding. The thesis concludes with some provisional 
indications of how the theme of hope might orient interpretation of Barth’s concept of 
Christian witness, with a view to addressing the criticisms identified.  
Keywords 
Barth, Witness, Christology, Human Agency, Doctrine of Reconciliation, Theological Ethics, 
Hope, Eschatology, Ontology, Epistemology 
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Introduction 
This thesis is a study of Karl Barth’s understanding of the Christian as witness. Karl 
Barth (1886-1968) is among the most influential theologians in the Christian Protestant 
tradition and, arguably, within the Christian tradition as a whole.1 In part, Barth’s 
influence can be traced to the way he “reorganized an entire discipline,” writes John 
Webster, comparing Barth to Wittgenstein, Freud and Saussure in terms of his 
revolutionary impact in his field.2  
Part of what made Barth’s theology so distinctive was his resolute insistence on allowing 
his object of study to dictate the terms and method of his work. As a consequence, 
Barth’s theology is unapologetically articulated in the language of the Christian doctrinal 
tradition, without attempting to situate this language within the broader range of other 
academic disciplines.3  It follows that in summarizing and commenting on Barth’s own 
dogmatic themes I will be employing the same language, as a reflection of Barth’s 
thought, its internal logic, and its application within the Christian tradition in which and 
for which it was written. 
The aspect of Barth’s work that will be under study in this thesis is his theology of 
vocation as it forms the basis for his distinctive understanding of Christian witness. The 
notion of “witness” has a long history in the Christian tradition, a history intertwined with 
church practices of mission and evangelism.4 While, for many centuries, the missionary 
dimension of Christianity took the form of an enterprise of expansion and occupation of 
                                                
1
 See, for example, Eberhard Jüngel, Karl Barth: A Theological Legacy, trans. Garrett E. Paul 
2
 Webster, Barth, 1. 
3
 For example, Barth writes, “Theological thinking […] will refrain from attempted self-vindication as its 
theme demands, and thus show its responsibility and relevance by simply fulfilling itself as thinking on this 
basis, and therefore by simply existing as the witness of faith against unbelief.” Church Dogmatics, study 
ed. eds. G.W. Bromiley and T.F. Torrance, trans. G.W. Bromiley, G.T. Thomson, and Harold Knight 
(1932-1938; repr. London: T&T Clark, 2009), I/1: 29. Citations refer to the 2009 edition for all volumes of 
Church Dogmatics cited.     
4
 For further reading on this history, see, for example, David Bosch, Transforming Mission: Paradigm 
Shifts in Theology of Mission 20th ann. ed. (New York: Orbis Books, 2011).    
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non-Christian lands, implicated in the conquest of non-Christian peoples and their 
religions, David Bosch suggests that this interpretation of mission changed gradually over 
the course of the twentieth century.5 At the beginning of the twentieth century, the focus 
of missionary practice, as notably but not exclusively seen within the North American 
context, for instance, was largely split into two branches, one broadly conservative 
branch emphasizing evangelism, and another broadly liberal branch emphasizing social 
change and reform.6       
While the aim of this thesis is neither one of historical comparison nor the application of 
Barth’s view of witness in a given sociocultural context, the enduring and ongoing 
significance of “witness” as a feature of the Christian tradition, and the impact of its 
outworking both in religious and public spheres, form part of the background which 
makes this thesis a worthwhile undertaking. Even though Christian mission and witness 
might look different in every age, it does not seem likely that they will disappear 
altogether, at least anytime soon. The reason, as Bosch suggests, is that “the Christian 
faith […] is intrinsically missionary;” it understands its truth to be both ultimate and 
important for all of humanity.7 Therefore, it can be argued, the study of witness and 
mission remains an ongoing task of responsible theology.8   
Barth’s theological work on witness and related issues are particularly interesting given 
the varied reception of his theology and his active involvement in public life. Barth’s 
theology is well known for the intensity of its focus on christology. Some of Barth’s 
critics see his christological rigor as inhibitive of his ability to make statements about the 
realities and complexities of human life. Given that theological discussion of witness has 
largely to do with human words and actions that purportedly bear testament to the divine, 
a theologian’s inability or neglect to adequately address these complexities would 
certainly call into question the value of his or her work on the matter. 
                                                
5
 Bosch, Transforming Mission, 1-2. 
6
 Ibid., 290-291.  
7
 Ibid., 9.  
8
 Ibid., 2.  
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Strikingly, the example of Barth’s own life demonstrates that while on one hand he wrote 
prolifically and profoundly about the transcendent God, he was also deeply involved in 
this-worldly matters of politics, church life, and social issues. To name but a couple of 
examples, as a pastor in Safenwil, Switzerland, Barth helped to establish labour unions,9 
and presided over a local anti-alcoholism group.10 Later, in Hitler’s Germany, Barth 
played an instrumental role in writing the Barmen Declaration, a document presented to 
the Confessing Church in Germany, which outlined a theological counter-position to the 
German Christians’ pro-nationalist stance.11 Clearly, whether or not his theology 
reflected it, Barth’s actions demonstrated an abiding commitment for very human 
concerns.   
Furthermore, in the last two to three decades, a number of scholars have challenged the 
perception that Barth fails to address “the human question” in his theology. They have 
largely done so by writing works that highlight and explain the importance of ethics in 
Barth’s theology, especially in his magnum opus, Church Dogmatics. These studies have 
done much to redeem Barth’s reputation when it comes to the perceived lack of attention 
to anthropological and ethical matters in his work.  
This thesis aims, in its own small way, to contribute to the work of fleshing out the 
“human” side of Barth’s work, through a close analysis of the way he develops his 
theology of Christian witness. To achieve such ends, the thesis will be largely expository, 
particularly in the first two chapters, then moving to a third chapter of more critical 
analysis, and ending with a brief constructive conclusion.     
In chapter one, I will lay out the christological basis for Barth’s concept of witness. This 
christological basis will help to situate Barth’s thought on Christian witness within the 
broader scope of his doctrine of reconciliation and his theology as a whole. A clear 
articulation of this christological foundation is critical both for understanding how Barth 
                                                
9
 Donald Wall, “Karl Barth and National Socialism,” Fides et historia 15, no. 2 (1983): 80.  
10
 Frank Jehle, Ever Against the Stream: The Politics of Karl Barth, 1906-1968, trans. Richard and Martha 
Burnett (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 2002), 27.  
11
 Wall, “Karl Barth and National Socialism,” 84-86.  
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develops his view of the Christian as witness, and for making sense of the criticisms 
leveled against his view.  
After having laid this foundation, I will proceed to an exegetical chapter on Barth’s 
concept of witness proper. This chapter will show how, for Barth, witness is not 
considered as a separate or secondary activity to the primary fact of ‘being a Christian’ 
but rather forms “the controlling principle of the structure of Christian existence.”12 The 
chapter will also explore key features of Barth’s unique understanding of witness, 
namely, its theocentrism, its grounding in ontology, and its outworking in human history. 
Throughout the Church Dogmatics, Barth repeatedly refers to human action that relates 
and corresponds to God’s action as “witness.” This thesis will, on the whole, restrict its 
focus to Barth’s view of the individual Christian person as witness, rather than exploring 
the ecclesial dimension of witness in his theology in any depth. I am limiting the thesis’ 
scope in this way because it would be impossible to adequately address the ecclesial 
dimension of witness, given the vast amount of material on it in Church Dogmatics. 
The third chapter brings Barth’s view of the Christian as witness under critical analysis. 
Here, features of his view identified in chapter two will be discussed in terms of the 
interpretive difficulties they present, namely, difficulties around the relationship between 
Barth’s view of witness and human experience.  
The thesis will end with a constructive conclusion, in which I will suggest that scholarly 
interpretations of Barth’s theology of Christian witness can be augmented by an emphasis 
on the theme of hope, as Barth outlines it in the concluding section of Church Dogmatics.  
                                                
12
 Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, study ed. eds. G.W. Bromiley and T.F. Torrance, trans. G.W. Bromiley 
(1953-1967; London: T&T Clark, 2009), IV/3.2, bk. 28:182-242.  
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Chapter 1  
1 The Christological Context of Witness in Barth’s 
Theology  
The aim of this chapter is to situate Barth’s understanding of Christian witness within the 
broader context of his theology. Barth’s concept of the Christian as witness follows from 
his understanding of Jesus Christ as witness, and so before turning to what it means, in 
Barth’s theology, for Christians to be witnesses, we must examine the christological 
foundation he prepares.  
In this chapter, I will establish that Barth primarily views witness as the ongoing work of 
reconciliation of Jesus Christ himself. This means that Barth not only views 
reconciliation in terms of its objective accomplishment in the life, death, and resurrection 
of Christ, but also in terms of Christ’s making this objective reconciliation known to 
Christians subjectively. I will also show how Barth’s distinctive understanding of 
parousia forms the basis for his suggestion that reconciliation is the ongoing work of 
Jesus Christ, in the power of the Holy Spirit.    
1.1 Witness Situated in the Doctrine of Reconciliation  
Barth’s discussion of Jesus Christ as the “True Witness” is located in his doctrine of 
reconciliation (Church Dogmatics, IV). This doctrine discusses the person and 
reconciling work of Christ in three aspects or as three ‘problems.’ The titles given to each 
of these three aspects of reconciliation are distinctly Christ-centred. They are: i) “Jesus 
Christ, the Lord as Servant,” ii) “Jesus Christ, the Servant as Lord,” and iii) “Jesus Christ, 
The True Witness.” These titles reflect Barth’s emphasis on reconciliation as fully 
accomplished by and in Jesus Christ, in contrast to, for example, naming the sections by 
reference to their human “benefits” (i.e., justification, sanctification, and so on). As John 
Webster comments, Barth “is quite clear that [the person and work of Christ] are 
ingredient in each other and therefore cannot be expounded in isolation from each 
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other.”13 For each of the three aspects, Barth explicitly states the importance of beginning 
with christology, before turning to what Christ’s work means for the rest of humanity.14  
That a Christian understanding of reconciliation is Christ-centred is hardly surprising; 
however, a closer look at the structure and content of the doctrine will show how Barth’s 
conception of Jesus Christ as True Witness and his understanding of Christ’s witness as 
belonging to his work of reconciliation are quite distinctive. For the purposes of this 
thesis, our interest lies particularly in how the inclusion of “Jesus Christ as Witness” in 
the doctrine of reconciliation frames a theologically unique understanding of Christian 
vocation, within which the role of Christian witness is explored.    
For each aspect of his doctrine of reconciliation, Barth describes a) who Christ is and 
what he does, b) a corresponding facet of human sinfulness which contradicts but is, 
more importantly, contradicted by Christ’s being and action, c) the effect of Christ’s 
work on “the renewal of human life,”15 d) the corresponding way in which the Holy 
Spirit works in the Christian community, and e) the corresponding work of the Holy 
Spirit in the life of the individual Christian person. Barth outlines these various parts of 
his doctrine of reconciliation in section §58. To make reference to this structure simpler, 
as well as to provide a visual representation of the triadic structure of the doctrine, I have 
constructed a table presenting these elements: 
 
 
                                                
13
 Webster, Barth, 115. 
14
 Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, study ed. eds. G.W. Bromiley and T.F. Torrance, trans. G.W. Bromiley 
(1953-1967; London: T&T Clark, 2009), IV/1, bk.21: 150-151; Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, study ed. 
eds. G.W. Bromiley and T.F. Torrance, trans. G.W. Bromiley (1953-1967; London: T&T Clark, 2009), 
IV/2, bk 24: 17-18; Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, study ed. eds. G.W. Bromiley and T.F. Torrance, trans. 
G.W. Bromiley (1953-1967; London: T&T Clark, 2009), IV/3.1: 9. 
15
 Webster, Barth, 117. 
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Table 1: The Triadic Structure of Karl Barth’s Doctrine of Reconciliation 
	  
I)	  Jesus	  Christ,	  the	  Lord	  
as	  Servant	  
II)	  Jesus	  Christ,	  The	  
Servant	  as	  Lord	  
	  
III)	  Jesus	  Christ,	  The	  True	  
Witness	  
A	  
The	  Obedience	  of	  the	  Son	  
of	  God	  
The	  Exaltation	  of	  the	  Son	  
of	  Man	  
The	  Glory	  of	  the	  Mediator	  
	  
B	  
The	  Pride	  and	  Fall	  of	  Man	   The	  Sloth	  and	  Misery	  of	  
Man	  
The	  Falsehood	  and	  
Condemnation	  of	  Man	  
	  
C	  
The	  Justification	  of	  Man	  	   The	  Sanctification	  of	  Man	  
	  
The	  Vocation	  of	  Man	  
D	  
The	  Holy	  Spirit	  and	  the	  
Gathering	  of	  the	  Christian	  
Community	  
The	  Holy	  Spirit	  and	  the	  
Upbuilding	  of	  the	  
Christian	  Community	  	  
The	  Holy	  Spirit	  and	  the	  
Sending	  of	  the	  Christian	  
Community	  	  
	  
E	  
The	  Holy	  Spirit	  and	  
Christian	  Faith	  
The	  Holy	  Spirit	  and	  
Christian	  Love	  
The	  Holy	  Spirit	  and	  
Christian	  Hope	  	  
	  
F16	  
Priestly	  Office	   Kingly	  Office	   Prophetic	  Office	  	  
The focus of this chapter will be on the third column in table 1, although reference will be 
made to the others, as the entire doctrine functions as a complex whole, and as the shape 
and rhythm of the doctrine’s structure are driven by Barth’s particular understanding of 
its content.17 
                                                
16
 This last row is not taken directly from the section and subsection titles as the rest of the table is but 
Barth does write extensively about the ‘offices’ of Christ corresponding to the three problems of 
reconciliation. 
17
 Webster comments that “although it is a structure of remarkable fascination and not a little intellectual 
beauty, its form is strictly subservient to Barth’s material aim, which is to present the heart of the Christian 
gospel as God’s work of reconciling all things to himself in Christ.” Barth, 117.   
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1.2 Jesus Christ as Mediator and Prophet  
After having discussed Jesus’ role as son of God and his role as son of man, Barth moves 
on to discuss his role as mediator. As mediator, Barth suggests, Christ is prophet and true 
witness. Barth distinguishes Christ’s work as mediator from his work as son of God and 
son of man by suggesting that the concern of the third problem of the doctrine of 
reconciliation “is with the How of the event in its inalienable distinction from the 
What.”18 In other words, while Christ reconciles humanity to God, described doctrinally 
as justification and sanctification, this reconciliation “also expresses, discloses, mediates 
and reveals itself,”19 by way of Christ’s action as mediator, witness, and prophet.   
Barth engages his theological predecessors on this point of the prophetic office of Christ 
and comes up dissatisfied with their lack of clarity in five main areas. His concerns 
revolve around the tendency of older theologies 1) to be unclear about the ‘content’ of 
Christ’s prophecy,20 2) to describe Christ’s priestly, kingly and prophetic roles as 
occurring in distinct stages and therefore not to be understood in unity,21 3) to place 
Christ’s prophecy alongside other prophecies or modes of revelation,22 4) to either 
conflate or separate Christ’s prophecy with the Church’s prophetic role too strongly,23 
and 5) to be unclear about to whom Christ prophesies, whether only to the Church or 
‘elect’ or also to the world at large.24 
Examining each of these criticisms in great detail would detract from the purpose of this 
chapter, but I contend that there is an overarching element present within all of them, 
which is worth pointing out. Namely, Barth’s main issue with earlier treatments is the 
possibility that reconciliation could at some point be abstracted from Jesus Christ as the 
                                                
18
 Barth, Church Dogmatics, IV/3.1: 6. 
19
 Ibid., 5. 
20
 Ibid., 12-13. 
21
 Ibid., 13-14. 
22
 Ibid., 14-15. 
23
 Ibid., 15-16. 
24
 Ibid., 16-17. 
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acting subject of its revelation or as the objective content of reconciliation. That the 
distinction between the “How” and the “What” of reconciliation is “inalienable,” 
therefore, becomes the focus of Barth’s own exposition. For Barth, Jesus Christ is his 
own self-witness, at all times and in all instances in which witness is truly borne to him. 
What seems to be at stake here, for Barth, is the unity of the objective basis and the 
subjective basis of reconciliation. 
1.3 Jesus Christ: The Objective Basis of 
Reconciliation 
First, let us consider how Barth emphasizes that Jesus Christ is the objective basis of 
reconciliation. Basically, Barth suggests that the message Jesus Christ delivers – as 
mediator, prophet, and witness – is identical with his own being and act. In suggesting 
Jesus Christ is not only the “messenger” but also “the message,” Barth excludes the 
possibility that reconciliation is “a principle and system of divine truth,”25 “a timeless 
idea,”26 a projection of what humans judge as significant,27 “the ratio of our own life-
action,”28 “a word of ecclesiastical or theological teaching,”29 or a worldview.30 In short, 
the reconciliation which Christ is and which Christ declares cannot be equated or 
substituted with anything else, including faithful theological exposition of it.  
Nevertheless, for Barth, the non-substitutable nature of reconciliation in Christ does not 
foreclose the possibility of faithful theological exposition altogether. Rather, Barth 
suggests, in discharging “the debt of response to what comes upon [one] in this encounter 
[with Christ],”31 one is capable of “confirm[ing] that the life of Jesus Christ speaks for 
                                                
25
 Ibid., 13. 
26
 Ibid. 
27
 Ibid., 69 
28
 Ibid. 
29
 Ibid., 240 
30
 Ibid., 245-248. 
31
 Ibid., 44. 
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itself.”32 The possibility for humans to confirm or acknowledge the self-declared 
reconciliation of Christ is foundational to Barth’s view of Christian witness, as will be 
developed in later chapters. In Barth’s view, acknowledgment of the self-spoken Word of 
Christ serves as the basis on which humanity can speak theologically at all.33   
1.3.1 The Particular Life of Jesus Christ: True God   
Barth proceeds to articulate his understanding of reconciliation by pointing to the life of 
Jesus Christ itself, the life of the God-man. The ‘fact’ that Jesus Christ is God is revealed, 
Barth suggests, through his own self-authenticating power. This self-authentication does 
not require any approval or verification by or from a different source, nor is any such 
approval or verification possible.34 George Hunsinger identifies revelation, in Barth’s 
theology, as the source of “divine facts” in distinction from all other human knowledge as 
“creaturely facts.”35 Hunsinger suggests that for an ordinary piece of information to be 
established as fact, it “must be assessed from a particular standpoint,” whereas 
“factuality, significance, and force cannot be conceded to [divine facts],” rather, such 
facts are self-demonstrating.36 This is not to suggest that humans cannot know such 
revelation-based facts, but rather that humans cannot explain such facts in terms of their 
other knowledge.37    
It follows that the self-revelation of Jesus Christ as God is not a statement that relates the 
name Jesus Christ to a preconceived, abstractly defined notion of what or who “God” is. 
For one, Jesus Christ’s life is intimately situated within the history of Israel and his self-
declaration, “is a similar expression and attestation of the dealings of God with men [as is 
                                                
32
 Ibid. 
 
33
 Barth develops this idea in detail in §6, “The Knowability of the Word of God,” especially in §6.2 “The 
Word of God and Man,” Church Dogmatics, I/1.  
34
 Barth, Church Dogmatics, IV.3.1: 45-46. 
35
 George Hunsinger, How to Read Karl Barth: The Shape of His Theology (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1991), 195. 
36
 Ibid., 195-6. 
37
 Ibid., 195-197. 
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found in the prophets of the Old Testament],”38 not a declaration of divinity in the 
abstract.  
Secondly, as God the son, Jesus Christ has the authority and power to reveal who God 
actually is, and thus to fill up the notion of “God” with its true content. Barth delineates 
his full understanding of what this means in Church Dogmatics IV/1, “Jesus Christ, the 
Lord as Servant,” corresponding to the first column in table 1. The fact of Jesus Christ’s 
existence as a man in history, with the self-authenticating power to declare himself God, 
shows that the God of Israel is a God who is willing to humble himself for the sake of his 
people because he wills to be God with them and not without them.39 Barth describes this 
as “the turning of God to man.”40 As this God, “He can give Himself up not merely to the 
creaturely limitation but to the suffering of the human creature, becoming one of these 
men, Himself bearing the judgment under which they stand willing to die and, in fact, 
dying the death which they have deserved.”41 In doing so, Jesus Christ justifies humanity. 
1.3.2 The Particular Life of Jesus Christ: True Human  
Yet Jesus Christ’s life also declares itself as a genuinely human life and not simply so as 
a vehicle by which God can communicate with humanity. Jesus Christ exists as the one 
human who, because he is also the Son of God, is able to declare what it is to be truly 
human and on the basis of whom all humanity is sanctified as well as justified. Barth’s 
full understanding of this is outlined in Church Dogmatics IV/2, “Jesus Christ, The 
Servant as Lord,” corresponding to the second column in table 1. Barth writes, “What has 
happened in Him as the one true man is the conversion of all of us to God, the realisation 
of true humanity.”42 
                                                
38
 Barth, Church Dogmatics, IV.3.1: 47. Note that in order to simplify the quoting of Barth’s work, 
throughout this thesis, direct quotations will replicate the unfortunately gendered language that remains in 
the study edition of the English translation of Church Dogmatics. I do not ideologically condone the use of 
this language. 
39
 See, for example, Barth, Church Dogmatics, IV/1, bk. 21: 79. 
40
 See, for example, Barth, Church Dogmatics, IV/3.1: 3. 
41
 Barth, Church Dogmatics, IV/1, bk. 21: 126. 
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Jesus Christ’s life demonstrates this true humanity as life lived in a free, faithful, and 
obedient relationship to God. “His practice in the continuing intercourse with God, His 
fellows and Himself is fashioned […] in analogy with the confidence which He has in the 
God who has so fully entrusted Himself to Him. It can consist only in a series of 
offerings, of acts of obedience, of achievements of service.”43 Barth is especially 
adamant that in the human life of Jesus Christ, the relationship between God and 
humanity that is revealed is not one “of a Do and Des, a Credit and Debit, a balance and 
debt.”44 It is a relationship of “reciprocal freedom” in which Christ’s “act of obedience, 
His rendering of service is His free act. It is not prompted or conditioned by the thought 
of a reward to be received from God,”45 just as God “crowns him […] without any 
consideration of merit […] but simply and solely in the sovereign good-pleasure which 
He has in Him and for the sake of this man Himself.”46 
The reconciliation, which is effective once and for all, is constituted in the acts of Jesus 
Christ who is true God and true human, and which is not merely a symbol for a deeper 
reality, nor can it be substituted by anything else. This, in Barth’s view, is the objective 
basis of reconciliation in Christ. 
1.4 Jesus Christ: The Subjective Basis of 
Reconciliation 
Barth’s claim is not only that Jesus, in his earthly historical life, reconciled God and 
humanity in covenant partnership and declared what he was doing so it could be known 
by those around, only to be attested by them to future generations who themselves would 
not personally know Jesus. Barth claims that Jesus personally continues to declare this 
reconciliation. With reference to Barth’s theology, John Webster writes, “To speak of 
Jesus as prophet is to speak of him as the immediate agent of the knowledge of himself: 
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he is, literally, self-proclaiming.”47 Jesus not only was, but also continues to be the 
subjective basis for the knowledge of reconciliation that humans experience. 
1.4.1 Resurrection 
Barth’s argument that Jesus Christ creates all knowledge of himself up to this day is 
based on his understanding of the resurrection. In Barth’s view, the reconciliation of the 
world, described as Christ’s work in his priestly and kingly offices, took place before 
Christ’s resurrection.48 The resurrection did not ‘add’ anything to the reconciliation 
accomplished in Christ. However, Barth writes that without the resurrection event, “the 
alteration of the situation between God and man as accomplished in Him, would have 
remained shut up in Him, because it would have been completely hidden from the 
disciples and the world and us, being quite unknown and therefore without practical 
significance.”49 Without Christ’s resurrection, death would have kept reconciliation 
hidden from human knowledge. In the resurrection, however, Christ re-crosses the border 
of death in such a way as to demonstrate death’s new powerlessness in him: 
The radically new thing in the coming again of the man Jesus who 
obviously died on the cross was […] the appearance of this terminated 
existence in its participation in the sovereign life of God, in its endowment 
with eternity, in the transcendence, incorruptibility and immortality given 
and appropriated to it in virtue of this participation for all its this-
worldliness. He came again in the manifestation or revelation of His prior 
human life as it had fallen victim to death as such, but had been delivered 
from death, invested with divine glory, and caused to shine in this glory, in 
virtue of its participation in the life of God.50 
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For Barth, it is of the utmost importance that Christ’s coming again in his resurrection is 
understood as occurring in earthly history just as he understands Christ’s life before his 
death on the cross as occurring within this history.51 In part, the historical occurrence of 
the resurrection is of such importance for Barth because it introduces the self-revelation 
of Christ, and in so doing the reconciliation of the world, as an objective “factor” in all 
that happens in the world post Christum.52 If the resurrection was based in, or contingent 
on human subjectivity as, for example, “a preservation of His picture in the memory, or 
perhaps its endowment with new significance,” or “a strengthened conviction of the 
correctness and importance of His message,”53 Barth argues, it would not have the power 
to summon faith in Christ.54 
However, the faith-summoning character of the resurrection does not derive solely from 
its historical happening, as though its occurrence in objective reality serves as “proof” of 
the reality of Jesus Christ and his Gospel. If that were the case, we could still posit a gap 
between the “the objective reality of Christ’s saving working” and its subjective 
realization.55 Rather, Barth understands that the resurrected Christ is the living Christ, 
who as such directly effects and maintains subjective knowledge of himself in those 
whom he encounters. By their own capacities, humans cannot establish this knowledge 
for themselves, nor can they create it in others.  
As discussed in the work of both Webster and Joseph Mangina, Barth’s treatment of the 
resurrection speaks to a problem Barth saw in liberal Protestant theology, in which 
objective claims about God needed translation into the realm of human subjectivity in 
order for them to have any significance for human life.56 This translation often took place 
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through “theor[ies] of spirituality, experience, or morality,”57 which Barth understood as 
a threat to the primacy of divine agency, according to Webster, as it created a need for  
“intermediate agencies” apart from Christ, for the actualization of God’s saving work in 
human life.58 This thesis does not have the scope to address whether or not Barth’s 
assessment of liberal Protestant theology was accurate or correct. The point here is 
simply to delineate Barth’s view of the relationship between objective and subjective 
aspects of reconciliation with respect to what he understood as problematic in liberal 
Protestant theology.59    
Humorously but not without a ring of truth, Barth writes that if intermediaries were 
necessary, a person would have “the not very encouraging prospect of being referred to 
the witness of Christianity and the impression made by the clarity, cogency and 
credibility of the institutions and activities of the Church or of various Christian 
personalities, groups and movements.”60 Consequently, in Barth’s understanding, the 
only way knowledge of Christ can have any real “validity and force” is if it comes 
directly from the living Christ,61 as he witnesses to himself in our age by the Holy Spirit.  
1.4.2 The Holy Spirit and parousia  
Barth spells out his understanding of the role of the Holy Spirit as Christ’s self-witness in 
our time in his subsection titled “The Promise of the Spirit.” He suggests that the 
resurrection is the “new coming” or “coming again” of Christ and discusses this coming 
again under the New Testament term parousia, or “effective presence.”62 According to 
Barth, in the New Testament the term parousia never refers to the first coming of Jesus 
Christ (“ i.e., to His history and existence within the limits of His birth and death, of 
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Bethlehem and Golgotha”63) and suggests that this is because, prior to the resurrection, 
“the incarnate Word was not yet revealed and seen in his glory.”64 
Interestingly, while Christ’s parousia and “coming again” often carry connotations of the 
“end times” in Christian theology, Barth makes the somewhat peculiar argument that “the 
New Testament knows of only one coming again of Jesus Christ,”65 which occurs in the 
Easter event.66 This does not mean that Barth posits a fully realized eschatology. Rather, 
Barth suggests that the one and only “coming again” of Christ takes place in many 
different forms through time and will “take place in a different and definitive form […] 
as the return of Jesus Christ as the goal of the history of the Church, the world and each 
individual, as His coming as the Author of the general resurrection of the dead and the 
Fulfiller of universal judgment.”67 Nevertheless, “The Easter event is […] the first form 
of this happening. From the standpoint of its substance, scope and content, it is identical 
with its occurrence in the forms which follow.”68 This move – placing Jesus’ coming 
again at the Easter event and introducing different “forms” to leave room for an 
eschatological return – has two implications or consequences that are noteworthy for the 
purposes of this study.   
First, on Barth’s interpretation, if Christ’s “coming again” occurred in its first form in the 
happening of the Easter event, then we cannot think of ourselves as living in a time in 
which Christ is absent. There is only one second coming and no “second departure” (or 
second death of Christ), so if it has already happened, Christ lives! If Christ’s parousia 
continues without break between the resurrection and the final judgment, then this 
“effective presence” of Christ in our time must, at least in Barth’s view, be that of the 
Holy Spirit. Significantly, though, Barth says “that the question of the operation of this 
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power […] does not originate in man’s sombre and sceptical assessment of himself and 
the world, but at the point where he is summoned to be confident and comforted in 
relation to himself and the world.”69 In other words, humans can speak about Christ’s 
continuing effective presence because Christ in his presence encounters us, and not 
because we need to fill a conceptual gap explaining Christ’s presence between the 
resurrection and his final return.  
John Webster notes that “Barth often maintained that this christological definition of the 
Spirit […] offered a way of rescuing theological talk of the Spirit from its fate at the 
hands of the theologians of immanence – whether that be in Schleiermacher’s account of 
Christian subjectivity or in Hegel’s metaphysics of absolute Spirit.”70 In addition to 
explaining the continued presence of living Christ, by identifying Christ and the Holy 
Spirit so closely, Barth (arguably) avoids the reduction of language about the Spirit to a 
religious moniker for what, in actuality, are human “intermediate agencies.”  
Webster goes on to identify a common criticism of Barth’s christological understanding 
of the Holy Spirit that “[…] the Spirit tends to be swallowed up by Christology. The 
personal agency of the Spirit in the life of the church and the Christian life is eclipsed and 
the Trinitarian structure of the work of reconciliation deformed, or at least left in need of 
completion.”71 This is not the place to enter into a full discussion of the adequacy of 
Barth’s understanding of the Holy Spirit but Webster’s comments do draw attention to a 
second noteworthy feature of Barth’s parousia discussion – the nature and telos of 
Christ’s work as the Holy Spirit.  
For Barth, the “effect” of the effective presence of Christ, as inaugurated at the 
resurrection, is that the particular existence of Jesus of Nazareth, has been shown to be 
“an existence as an inclusive being and action enfolding the world, the humanity distinct 
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from Himself and us all. […].”72 Therefore, in Barth’s theology, this universal 
effectiveness does not remain to be fulfilled at the end of time, and so ongoing divine 
activity is understood as a witness to the effectiveness of reconciliation already 
accomplished. What seems to be the absence of the universal lordship of Christ in our 
time is only an “apparent absence,” it is “hidden from us.”73 
By contrast, if the final verdict regarding human reconciliation with God were still to 
come, such that Christ’s saving work were an opportunity that needed to be acted upon in 
order for it to be effective, the Holy Spirit’s role might be construed as bringing people to 
this effective faith. In this latter case, the details of which could be articulated in many 
ways, the resurrection and the final judgment would not only differ in form; they would 
differ in scope as well.74 Whether or not Barth’s interpretation of the biblical use of the 
term parousia and discussion of Christ’s coming again is correct, it does illustrate the 
distinctiveness of his understanding of the Holy Spirit as Christ’s self-witness, in contrast 
to other ways in which the Holy Spirit’s work might be construed.   
1.5 Reconciliation as Ongoing    
Returning now to a phrase quoted earlier, Barth claims the third problem of the doctrine 
of reconciliation “is [concerned] with the How of the event in its inalienable distinction 
from the What.”75 So far, this presentation has mostly considered the “How” and the 
“What,” (or Christ as both the subjective and objective basis for reconciliation), in 
relative distinction from one another, and this has been done for the sake of clarity. At 
this point though, a reminder of the inalienability of these two aspects will help lead into 
the discussion of how Barth sees Christ’s self-witness as having implications for human 
lives and human history.  
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Barth, although he does strongly emphasize the “once and for all” character of Christ’s 
reconciling work, does not think of Christ’s self-witness as merely relaying the narrative 
of his earthly life or relaying a message that could, theoretically, be relayed by someone 
else. While witness must be Christ’s self-witness to guarantee its validity and force, Barth 
does not regard Christ’s self-witness as a sort of “rubber stamp,” authenticating the 
content of the message.  
Rather, in the act of declaring the reconciliation accomplished in him, Jesus Christ is 
actively reconciling people to himself. The declaration belongs to the reconciliation, and 
this is why Barth discusses “Jesus Christ, The True Witness” as a third movement in the 
doctrine of reconciliation alongside his work as the turn of God to humanity and of 
humanity to God. In connection with the discussion of resurrection and parousia above, 
while in Barth’s view reconciliation is fully accomplished, Jesus Christ continues to 
make this reconciliation effective in different forms.     
The paradox of the fully accomplished reconciliation that continues to be made real and 
true in human life is indeed a confusing one. George Hunsinger helpfully describes this 
paradox as the “problem of how to relate the existential76 to the objective moment of 
salvation […] to which Barth finds himself returning again and again.”77 While 
Hunsinger acknowledges that Barth is, in many cases, content to rest with the mystery 
inherent in such paradoxes,78 Hunsinger also explores this particular paradox through the 
motif of personalism, which “signifies that in Barth’s theology truth is ultimately a matter 
of encounter.”79 The truth about the (already) reconciled relationship between God and 
humanity, necessarily involves humans and though only Christ can initiate this encounter, 
he does so in a way that truly involves human beings in “a personal fellowship 
established in Christ between divine freedom as truly divine, and human freedom as truly 
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human.”80 Christ’s self-witness is not one-way communication … it creates a “[divine-
human] community of action”81 with real consequences in human history. Barth writes 
that “[the life of Jesus Christ] could not be called good news,” if it were abstracted from 
the realm of creaturely life, though “it might perhaps be described as the interesting 
disclosure of an ontological reality.”82 Referring back to table 1, Barth sees “vocation” as 
the renewal in human life that corresponds to Christ’s actions of self-witness.  
1.6 Chapter Conclusion 
A detailed examination of Barth’s concept of vocation will be the subject of the next 
chapter. What we have established thus far, however, is that Barth understands Jesus 
Christ to be the mediator and revealer (subjectively), of the reconciliation accomplished 
in him (objectively), and that his self-revelation is, indeed, reconciliation itself. We have 
seen that Barth bases this position on his view of the resurrection as the second coming of 
Christ, in which the parousia, or “effective presence” of Christ is inaugurated, such that 
in the power of the Holy Spirit, Jesus Christ now declares that his life and being have 
significance for all of humanity and reality. We have indicated that Barth understands this 
ongoing reconciliation as renewing and transformative in human life, and gestured 
towards the involvement of human participation in this renewal and transformation.     
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Chapter 2  
2 Karl Barth’s Concept of the Christian As Witness 
This chapter aims to describe and analyse Karl Barth’s concept of the individual 
Christian person as witness. As noted, the scope of this project does not allow for an 
examination of Barth’s view of the Church as the community of witness because of the 
vast amount written on this ecclesial dimension in the Church Dogmatics. Rather, the 
analysis will proceed by way of a close reading of CD IV/3 §71, titled “The Vocation of 
Man.” The choice to restrict close analysis here to “The Vocation of Man” is admittedly 
pragmatic but the selected section also contains the fullest explanation in Church 
Dogmatics of the centrality of witness to the life of the Christian individual.83 
2.1 Establishing Witness as Central to Christian Life 
A first indicator of the importance of Barth’s concept of witness to his theology is its 
situation within his systematic theology. Strikingly, Barth’s discussion of the Christian as 
witness is not articulated within a theology of mission per se but rather is integrated into 
his doctrine of reconciliation, in the context of a broader discussion of vocation. As 
discussed in the preceding chapter, vocation is the corresponding effect in human life to 
Jesus Christ’s ongoing act of self-witness, and as such sits alongside justification and 
sanctification (the corresponding effects to Jesus Christ’s work as God turning to 
humanity and humanity turning to God). Vocation, in Barth’s theology, takes on a non-
traditional meaning.  
“The Vocation of Man” is divided into six subsections, of which “The Christian as 
Witness” is one. In the preceding subsection, “The Goal of Vocation,” Barth asserts that: 
“The purpose of man’s vocation is that he should become a Christian, a homo 
christianus.”84 In “The Christian as Witness,” Barth aims to “show and develop […] 
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what the goal of vocation is in detail, namely, what it means practically and concretely to 
become and be a Christian.”85 So, as will be discussed in detail, Barth posits that 
practically and concretely, to be a Christian first and foremost means to be a witness. By 
framing his discussion of the Christian as witness this way, Barth precludes witness from 
being understood as a secondary activity to some other primary defining activity or 
characteristic of the Christian.    
Differences in what is considered central or primary to Christian existence have 
significant implications for how Christian witness and mission are understood. Therefore, 
in addition to simply acknowledging that Christians must be witnesses and describing this 
role, Barth demonstrates how witness must actually be central to and definitive of 
Christian existence. In part, he does so by examining three other possible and common 
ways of understanding that which differentiates Christian from non-Christian life: 1) life 
in eschatological tension;86 2) life characterized by a distinctive ethos;87 and 3) life in the 
reception and possession of salvation.88 
Significantly, Barth does not altogether reject the claim that these elements can be, often 
are, or even necessarily must be part of the life of the Christian, but he does reject them 
as controlling principles. Tracing his arguments for rejecting these three commonly 
asserted controlling principles will help to demonstrate the relationship between that 
which is considered central to Christian existence and the nature of Christian action 
(particularly with respect to non-Christians), as well as clarifying Barth’s argument for 
the centrality of witness to the structure of Christian existence. Barth’s treatment of the 
latter two common answers will be discussed now, while his treatment of the first fits 
more naturally into the discussion of Barth’s own concept of witness, which will follow.  
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2.1.1 Christian Ethos: Rejected as Controlling Principle  
Barth considers the possibility that the controlling principle of the distinctive structure of 
Christian existence consists in a specifically Christian ethos. He writes, “[O]n this view, 
the call of Jesus Christ is decisively an invitation and demand that the men to whom it 
comes should adopt a particular inward and outward line of action and conduct of which 
we have the basic form in the twofold command to love God and our neighbours and a 
normative description in the imperatives of the Sermon on the Mount or the admonitions 
of the apostolic Epistles.”89 In analysing this possibility, Barth first mentions some 
theological difficulties that result from understanding a Christian ethos as the controlling 
principle of the structure of Christian existence. These difficulties are not finally the 
reason Barth provides for his rejection of this possibility. The structure of this argument, 
which Barth repeats elsewhere, is significant for understanding Barth’s relationship to 
other types of theology. 
The theological difficulties that follow from understanding a Christian ethos as the 
controlling principle of Christian life, according to Barth, consist in the abstraction of this 
ethos from its basis “which is anterior to it and which controls and determines it […].”90 
Without investigating the basis for adopting such an ethos, the ethos itself may come to 
be understood as absolute and subsequently it “loses the distinctiveness, originality, and 
uniqueness which mark it off from the type of ethos common to the rest of the world and 
humanity.”91 Barth admits that the “Christian” ethos has much in common with many 
other moral systems and that often non-Christians are more exemplary in their morality 
than Christians.92 Thus, if the controlling principle of Christianity is an ethos which is not 
only approximated by others but can also be accomplished more expertly by them, the 
relative importance of choosing one ethos over another decreases. Furthermore, as an 
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abstract principle, Christian moralism becomes “self-glorifying,”93 as it points to a 
purported moral superiority of Christians themselves, rather than to “the meaning and 
basis of this ethos.”94  
Despite these theological difficulties, Barth still considers the possibility that the 
Christian ethos is that which distinguishes Christians from other people. If this were the 
case, “[w]hat is demanded of the Christian would simply be demanded because it is, and 
he would have to obey simply because he has. Jesus Christ would thus be his Lord only 
in virtue of a formal authority to command certain things without any obligation to 
disclose their purpose.”95 Barth’s real objection to understanding the Christian ethos as 
the controlling principle of the structure of Christian existence is not, finally, that human 
obedience to a merely formal authority is untenable.  
Rather, Barth rejects that Christ’s authority is merely formal because the “unconditional 
commanding and unconditional obedience,” of Jesus Christ and the Christian, 
respectively, “both take place with a meaning and basis which are self-revealed and 
therefore knowable.”96 This basis and reason will be explored in greater detail later. 
According to Barth, then, while God could conceivably exercise a purely formal 
authority, he has in fact revealed a basis and reason for his authority, “the particular being 
of Jesus Christ in Christians and of Christians in Jesus Christ.”97 Therefore, the Christian 
ethos cannot be the “first or final word in a relevant definition of the manner of the 
Christian […].”98 
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2.1.2 Experience of Salvation: Rejected as Controlling Principle 
Using a similar line of reasoning, Barth also examines what he calls the “classic”99 
answer to the question of the controlling principle of the structure of Christian existence. 
Although this answer has been elaborated in different ways, the classic answer is that the 
existence of Christians is to be “distinguished from others by the address, reception, 
possession, use and enjoyment of the salvation of God given and revealed to the world by 
God in Jesus Christ.”100 Thus, the classic answer makes the experience of salvation and 
its benefits central to that which is distinctively Christian.  
As in his consideration of a Christian ethos as the controlling principle, Barth first 
enumerates a number of theological difficulties that can arise and that have arisen 
historically when salvation is made the centrally defining characteristic of Christian life. 
Where those who would make the Christian ethos the controlling principle do not pursue 
the question of the nature of Christ’s authority far enough, as Barth would have it, neither 
do those who assert the classic answer provide a sufficient response.  
If the human experience of salvation is central to Christian life, the obedience of the 
Christian to the command of Christ can be construed as a response of gratitude to grace 
given.101 However, Barth claims that the grace and gratitude or, “the divine gift and the 
divine task,”102 “[e]ven at best […] will seem only as it were to be glued together.”103 So, 
Barth concludes that “the Christian experience of grace and salvation is no more ultimate 
than the Christian ethos, but both have a common origin in the conjoined being of Jesus 
Christ and the Christian […].”104 
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Further theological difficulties that Barth identifies with the classic answer cluster around 
its anthropocentrism. Barth charges the classic answer with anthropocentrism because it 
is based on human self-reflection and experience.105 If what it means to be a Christian is 
only grounded in human experience, then the subjective state of the Christian becomes of 
utmost importance, to the extent that one’s assurance of whether or not one is a Christian 
relies on one’s constant experience of the benefits of salvation.106 
Furthermore, many non-Christians, “demonstrate […] that even without the benefit of 
Jesus Christ, and in a very different language, conceptuality and terminology, they have 
something analogous to or even identical with […] Christian being, possession and 
capacity, namely, […they] enjoy […] something of the same peace and patience and trust 
and discipline and freedom in and in face of the world[.]”107 The similarity here between 
Christian and non-Christian salvific experiences, like the similarity between Christian 
and non-Christian ethical systems, suggests a certain level of relativism when it comes to 
how such experiences are achieved. So, somewhat counter-intuitively, if experiencing 
salvation is the distinctive principle that structures Christian existence, then the necessity 
of experiencing it through Christianity is diminished.  
Lastly, the anthropocentrism of the classic answer, by focusing on personal experience 
and enjoyment of salvation, risks reducing salvation to a possession of Christians which 
they might lord over others.108 Barth expresses the bizarre character of this situation by 
juxtaposing “the selflessness and self-giving of God and Jesus Christ”109 with the 
“sanctioning and cultivating of an egocentricity,”110 which places satisfaction of human 
desires and needs at the centre of Christian existence. This egocentricity is analogous to 
the “self-glorifying” nature of an absolutised Christian moralism, discussed above.   
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Again, using a similar line of reasoning to his assessment of the Christian ethos as 
controlling principle, Barth does not actually reject the classic answer on the basis of 
these theological difficulties. Rather, he turns to “the answer which is given in Holy 
Scripture,” to the question “What kind of goal […] does the event have which is there 
described as the calling of specific men?”111 Barth’s turn to scripture here is significant 
in that he seeks to base his rejection of the classic answer in divine revelation, rather than 
in human reflection, which was the source of the classic answer to begin with. Just as the 
theological difficulties associated with the Christian ethos, deduced from human 
reasoning, were not sufficient reason to reject it as controlling principle, neither are those 
associated with the classic answer.  
Where Barth turned to the “self-revealed and therefore knowable,”112 meaning and basis 
for the Christian ethos, Barth here turns to scripture to find the grounds for rejecting the 
classic answer as controlling principle. What he finds when he does so is that “[t]he 
personal history of the called and its happy outcome never become a real theme,”113 in 
the biblical passages describing vocation. While “we can glimpse […] that such a 
personal experience was directly or indirectly linked with the decisive thing, i.e. with 
what came upon the called from the hand of God,”114 personal experience was not central 
to these events, or to the structure of existence of those called, following these events. For 
this reason, Barth rejects that the classic answer, the personal experience and enjoyment 
of salvation, can be made the controlling principle of the structure of Christian existence.  
2.1.3 Witness as Controlling Principle of Christian Existence 
In addition to denying the personal experience of salvation as central to the biblical 
passages describing vocation, Barth affirms something else as central: “existence in 
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execution of the task which God has laid upon them [the called].”115 This task, as Barth 
goes on to explain, is that of witnessing,116 and thus “witness” is, for Barth, the 
controlling principle of the structure of Christian existence.  
Barth explains that there is a twofold sense in which the Christian is and acts as a witness. 
First of all, as scripture shows, God encounters those he calls in such a way that they 
literally perceive, and so become witnesses of  “His being in his past, present and future 
action in the world and in history, of His being in His acts among and upon men.”117 
Secondly, the same God who enables these perceptions of his acts enables the called not 
to be “idle spectators” but rather to be “witnesses who can and must declare what they 
have seen and heard like witnesses in a law-suit.”118 
This “must” thus becomes the most determinative principle in the life of those called and 
encountered by God. Our discussion will now turn to an examination of some of the key 
characteristics of Barth’s concept of witness, throughout which we will frequently return 
to the problems Barth associated with positing the Christian ethos or salvation as central, 
in order to see how positing witness as central addresses these problems.  
2.2 Features of Barth’s Concept of Witness  
2.2.1 Witness as Theocentric  
To begin, Barth’s understanding of the controlling principle of the structure of Christian 
existence is different from the others he has discussed so far, because it is theocentric 
(including particularly christocentric and particularly pneumatocentric elements), rather 
than anthropocentric. In addition to seeking the controlling principle through revelation, 
rather than self-reflection, Barth understands God as solely responsible for determining 
and creating “Christian existence” in every instance. Whereas the behaviour associated 
                                                
115
 Ibid., 202. 
116
 Ibid., 202-203.  
117
 Ibid., 202. 
118
 Ibid., 203. 
29 
 
with a Christian ethos and the experience associated with salvation may be abstracted 
from their contexts, one’s character as Christian witness cannot be abstracted from an 
actual encounter with the God of Jesus Christ, because this encounter is the only source 
and impetus for such a witness. It is God who calls, and thus divine action always has 
priority and control over human action in the relationship between the two.  
This focus on divine action has implications for the way Christians understand their own 
role as witnesses. Christian witness, under this view, is primarily a means by which 
Christ witnesses to himself.119 Given that only an encounter with God can ever truly 
make a person a witness to God, according to Barth, Christians cannot understand 
themselves as in possession of a formula or requisite set of beliefs for becoming and 
being Christian.  
Rather than a person becoming convinced of the validity of Christianity as a “self-
grounded and self-motivating hypothesis,”120 Barth suggests, “we have had to learn anew 
that the Holy Spirit is the Lord and Master of the Christian spirit and not simply identical 
with it, and that the Word of God is His Word and therefore cannot be understood merely 
as the self-declaration of the Christian spirit.”121 Barth’s claim here goes beyond the 
suggestion that Christian witness can only be “effective” if God wills it, or if God is 
somehow at work in those to whom the Christian witnesses. Such an understanding still 
allows for the possibility that the Christian witness has in his or her possession a correct 
hypothesis or set of rules for “being Christian,” which God confirms. For Barth, the 
relationship of priority between Christian witness and God’s self-witness is reversed: 
“The Christian is called to be the accompanying and confirming sign of the living Word 
of God. […] He never can nor will speak it himself.”122 
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If the Christian can never capture, possess, or perfectly communicate the Word of God in 
his or her witness, then particular cultural or historical understandings of the “Christian 
message” ought not to be considered ultimate. John Franke sees this relativization of 
human theological language as important for addressing the problem of “sectarianism in 
Christian community as different expressions of the church conclude that they have 
arrived at the one true system of doctrine.”123 Of course, the witness can never escape his 
or her cultural historical context and so must witness from the standpoint of his or her 
own particularity. However, Barth’s emphasis on divine action and divine freedom seems 
to recommend a certain openness on the part of Christians with respect to what “true 
Christianity” might look like and cautions against making one’s own understanding 
normative. Franke writes, “No single community, tradition, or perspective can speak for 
the whole church.”124 As noted above, when this happens, Christians often become self-
glorifying and egocentric, rather than attesting to Jesus Christ’s lordship.  
2.2.2 Witness as Ontological 
In addition to being theocentric, Barth’s concept of witness is ontologically grounded. 
Theocentricity, on its own, does not explain how human witness relates to divine self-
witness, or how the execution of the task of witnessing determines Christian existence as 
a whole. Barth’s ontological conception of witness helps to explain these claims. In 
thinking about the way human witness relates to divine self-witness, in light of Barth’s 
theocentric approach, we may wonder why, if only God has the capacity to provide 
proper witness to God’s self, the human need be involved at all. Barth notes this logical 
difficulty and writes,  
If this co-operation of theirs is actually demanded by Christ in their unity 
with him as the meaning and principle of their existence as Christians, and 
if it is not ordained in vain, this is to be established and explained only by 
the fact that the free action of Christ even in this prophetic form, being 
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bound neither to anyone nor to anything, is in a supremely specific sense 
the action of free divine grace, and as such it does not exclude but includes 
this human co-operation. […] In a distinctive overflowing of divine grace 
it would have it so. He thus calls Christians to Himself, to His side, to His 
discipleship, to His service, and uses them as His heralds.125 
Here, we can see that, according to Barth, while God does not require human action, he 
chooses to include it. If this inclusion were to take the form of an arbitrary command, 
however, we would be in a similar situation to those who only affirm Christ’s formal 
authority in commanding a Christian ethos. Discipleship and service would not be 
necessary to, and therefore definitive of, Christian existence but rather an outside 
imposition on, or requirement of, the human being, regardless of its validity or worth.  
Because, in Barth’s view, God decidedly chooses to include human co-operation in his 
witness, it cannot be merely an optional element of Christian being but is necessary to it 
as such. As in the above quoted passage, Christian co-operation “is actually demanded by 
Christ in their unity with him as the meaning and principle of their existence […].”126 It is 
because Christian being consists in unity with Christ127 that divine witness is able to 
include and require human witness, and that this task of witness is ontologically 
constitutive of Christian existence. 
Rooting witness in ontology prevents witness from being understood as something that 
the Christian could, theoretically, choose not to do. However, it is also possible to 
understand the controlling principle of Christian existence as based in ontology, without 
understanding witness as this controlling principle. Barth, for instance, engages with two 
other ways of understanding Christianity ontologically.  
“Being” plays a significant role in the classic answer – that the experience of salvation is 
central to Christian existence – which Barth rejects. The classic answer focuses on a 
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perceived change in being; this “personal experience [of salvation] is the most obvious, 
illuminating and impressive thing to catch the attention of Christians when they consider 
the great alteration and singularity of their status […].”128 In the classic answer, then, 
salvation alters the Christian ontologically. Christians “are the beloved of God […] not in 
their own power but in that which is given them by God in Jesus Christ through the Holy 
Spirit,”129 and this happens to Christians “in distinction from others.”130 Therefore, under 
the classic answer, Christians enjoy an altered ontological status that differentiates them 
from those who have not undergone the experience of salvation.  
Barth also engages a second possible way of understanding what distinguishes Christians 
from others as primarily ontological. This other possibility is “that Christians are those 
who, as recipients of the kerygma of the eschatological divine act accomplished in the 
death of Jesus Christ, recognise, affirm and grasp within the world the possibility of their 
own non-worldly being, and therefore transcend and leave behind the world even as they 
still exist within it […].”131 So, the primary purpose of Christ’s life, death, and 
resurrection, would be to make possible “a being in this antithesis [of worldliness and 
unworldliness].”132 This possibility is the first of the three controlling principles that 
Barth rejects, before rejecting Christian moralism and the personal experience of 
salvation.  
This possibility differs from the classic answer in the way it construes the relationship 
between the actions of Jesus Christ and Christian ontology. Personal salvation changes 
the ontological status of the Christian in distinction from others, or at least his or her 
perception of this status. In this first possibility, however, reception of Christ’s kerygma 
changes the Christian’s perception of human ontology generally. The Christian is one 
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who understands that non-worldly being is possible, and lives in the knowledge of this 
possibility, rather than living with a changed ontological status.  
Barth, rather cursorily, dismisses “life in eschatological tension” as the controlling 
principle of Christian existence for the stated reason that it implies “a lack of proportion 
between the mountain-moving power of the revelation and knowledge of Jesus Christ and 
its supposed and relatively trivial result.”133 In what follows, however, I will demonstrate 
a more complex relationship between the ontology of “life in eschatological tension” and 
Barth’s own ontological position.  
In order to determine whether or not Barth’s concept of witness is helpful, at least in 
respect of its ontology, it is necessary to look in more detail at the distinctive features of 
his characterization of ontology. Contemporary scholarship on Barth’s work describes his 
notion of ontology as covenantal134 and actualistic,135 and tends to contrast his ontology 
with substantialistic136 and essentialist137 approaches.   
2.2.2.1 Covenantal Ontology 
To clarify what it means to call Barth’s ontology “covenantal,” it is necessary to refer to 
his doctrine of election, as elaborated in Church Dogmatics II/2, although a detailed 
explanation of this doctrine is outside the scope of this study. Briefly, Barth suggests that 
God’s election is the election of grace; that is, God has eternally elected to be God with 
and for, not apart from or against, humanity. God has elected to be “the One who loves in 
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freedom” not only in and of himself, but also for humanity.138 This means that God has 
also elected humanity as his partner in this covenant of love and grace.139  
Barth suggests that humans are capable of making this assertion about God’s eternal 
decision to elect because God himself reveals it to humanity in time, in the event of 
reconciliation. “Dogmatics has no more exalted or profound word […] than this: that God 
was in Christ reconciling the world unto Himself (2 Cor. 519). As the doctrine of the 
Word of God it can describe the Christian knowledge of God upon the basis of God’s 
self-revelation only with a constant and whole-hearted reference to the event which as 
such is both the source of truth and the truth itself.”140 Because humans cannot know 
anything about God through speculation, according to Barth, we must rely on God’s self-
revelation, which takes place in Christ’s incarnation and which declares that God chooses 
to be in fellowship with humanity, to the point that he takes rejection upon himself for 
humanity’s sake. Humans cannot “go behind” this gracious decision of God, to be God 
with and for humanity, in order to speculate about God’s character and plans prior to, or 
aside from, the election of grace.141 
By placing election firmly at the beginning of dogmatic reflection then, within the 
doctrine of God, Barth characterizes all activity of God in history as occurring within this 
election of grace and thus within the covenant that God has chosen to establish with 
humanity.142 Creation itself, then, is not independent of reconciliation and redemption, 
but rather is eternally determined for it and cannot resist it.143  
This doctrine of election necessarily has dramatic consequences for Barth’s 
understanding of Christian ontology. Bruce McCormack describes Barth’s 
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circumscription of all history by the doctrine of election as “establish[ing] a 
hermeneutical rule which […] allow[s] the church to speak authoritatively about what 
God was doing – and, indeed, who and what God was/is – […] without engaging in 
speculation.”144 Given this hermeneutical rule, there is no human ontology that can be 
considered apart from the covenant of grace; this covenant determines all human being, 
hence the description of Barth’s ontology as a “covenant” or “covenantal” ontology.  
This covenant ontology differs from the ontology associated with the classic answer. 
Because the covenant of grace is eternal and determines all human being, and because 
this grace is made known through the reconciliation accomplished in Christ, it follows 
that the reconciliation accomplished in Christ is sufficient and meaningful for all of 
humanity. Barth writes, “Christ lives indeed in Christians, as He also lives in non-
Christians, as the Mediator, Head and Representative of all, as the new and true Adam. 
He is simply the Son of God and Man in whose life and death the whole world is 
reconciled with God […]. [T]here is none who exists wholly without Him, who does not 
belong to Him […].”145Because all of humanity is already reconciled to God in Christ, a 
personal experience of salvation does not change or alter one’s status with respect to this 
reconciliation, as in the classic answer.  
It is not the goal, then, of Christian witness to persuade others that the personal 
experience of salvation is necessary for their reconciliation to God. Consequently, the 
content of witness is neither “[the Christian] nor the processes by which he has become [a 
Christian] nor the privileges which he has come to share as such.”146 In this way, Barth’s 
covenantal ontology guards against the danger of egocentricity and self-glorification that 
can result from the ontology associated with the classic answer.  
Furthermore, since the subjective or experiential element of salvation is not actually 
associated with the effectiveness or reality of salvation, and so the personal experience of 
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salvation is not the pin on which the structure of Christian existence hangs, the 
abstraction of this experience from the specific context of Christian salvation does not 
threaten the distinctiveness or uniqueness of salvation. Here we are reminded of the 
theocentricity of Barth’s approach. If human ontology is covenant ontology, human 
perception of a change in status, alteration, or transformation of the self cannot be 
considered ultimate or primary in defining what the Christian is.147  
While we have seen one way in which Barth’s covenant ontology differs from the 
ontology of the classic answer due to its grounding in his doctrine of election, we must 
now consider how Barth’s covenant ontology shapes his concept of witness. If all 
humans are ontologically constituted by the election of the covenant of grace, why is 
witness necessary and how do Christians, as witnesses, differ ontologically from others? 
Barth writes, “There is another form, however, in which Christ lives in the Christian. In 
this form, too, He lives for the world and for all men, as their Mediator, Head and 
Representative, as the new and true Adam. But in this form He does not live in all men. 
He lives only in those called by Him, in Christians.”148 This passage demonstrates that 
while Christians share a covenant ontology with all humanity, Christ relates to Christians 
differently than he relates to others in that he lives “in them.”  
This unity with Christ, which has already been touched upon, is for the Christian “an 
awakening to active knowledge of the accomplished reconciliation and the alteration of 
the world and his own situation grounded in this event.”149 In Barth’s view, then, the 
person who becomes a Christian in being called by Christ into unity with him, 
understands not only herself as reconciled to God, but in fact all of humanity as 
reconciled to God. The difference is one of awareness about the nature of things in 
general, not only about her own status in relation to God.  
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Consequently, in Barth’s view, the purpose of Christian witness is to declare to the world 
what the Christian already knows to be true about it – that the world is already reconciled 
to God in Christ and belongs to God in the covenant of grace. One implication of this 
covenant ontology is that Christians must not understand themselves as the arbiters of 
“true” Christianity. Any sort of “in-group” or “us-versus-them” mentality is ruled out. 
Witness takes on a posture of humility rather than superiority or judgment because what 
is ultimately important about Christian existence, life lived in the covenant of grace, is 
not true only of Christians, but of all humanity.  
Barth writes of non-Christians, “no matter who or what they are or how they live, their 
vocation is before them no less surely than that Jesus Christ has died and risen again for 
them. This is something of unconditional significance. […] Anything we know 
concerning the fact that they are not called and not Christians can finally be only a matter 
of more or less well-founded conjecture.”150 Note that Barth is not suggesting that 
distinctions between Christians and others are insignificant and meaningless. The real 
difference between active knowledge of Christ’s lordship and ignorance of Christ’s 
lordship requires Christian witnesses to show “genuinely unlimited openness of the called 
in relation to the uncalled, an unlimited readiness to see in the aliens of today the brothers 
of tomorrow, and to love them as such.”151  
While covenant ontology clearly differs from that which Barth associates with a classic 
view of salvation, in a way it is similar to the ontology he associates with “life in 
eschatological tension.” In Barth’s view, the world, humans generally, and individuals in 
particular have always been ontologically constituted by election to the covenant of grace 
but in becoming a Christian, the individual is awakened to this truth. Similarly, for those 
who suggest the Christian life is most distinctively one of eschatological tension, the 
possibility of non-worldly being always exists, but in becoming a Christian, the 
individual is awakened to this truth. Clearly, the content of the truth that a person 
recognizes upon becoming a Christian is different in the two cases and this in itself may 
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be enough to justify Barth’s quick dismissal of “life in eschatological tension” as a viable 
contender for the controlling principle of Christian existence. The similarity between the 
two possibilities, however, draws attention to a feature of Barth’s ontology that requires 
further explication.  
2.2.2.2 Actualistic Ontology 
Both cases emphasize specific knowledge as definitive of Christian existence but, as has 
been discussed, Barth refuses to ground the controlling principle of Christian existence in 
any human capacity or possession. To resolve this apparent contradiction, we must 
consider what it means for Barth’s ontology to be actualistic. 
For Barth, Christian unity with Christ means far more than a simple attainment of 
knowledge, regardless of how important and glorious that knowledge might be. It is 
knowledge imparted by a specific person, Jesus Christ, and apart from this act of 
imparting, this self-revelation, it cannot exist, regardless of what a person may think that 
he or she knows.152 Barth writes, “[Jesus Christ] is not a figure of the remote past, […] 
but from whom we are separate in our own time apart from […] recollection […]. He 
lives, acts and speaks as [our] Contemporary.”153 If the covenantal character of Barth’s 
ontology were taken on its own, it might be possible to misunderstand God’s decision 
about human being-in-covenant as only past, and therefore accessible by the same human 
means used to attain all other historical knowledge. However, the actualism in Barth’s 
ontology guards against this possible misunderstanding by emphasizing the living 
Christ’s ongoing and present work.  
Paul Nimmo writes extensively of Barth’s actualistic ontology in Being in Action: The 
Theological Shape of Barth’s Ethical Vision. He emphasizes that knowledge of God, 
from a human perspective is “in the act of revelation in Jesus Christ, […] exclusively 
actualized. In this event of revelation, the order of human knowing is brought into 
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correspondence with the true order of being.”154 This description helps to clarify the 
relationship between the eternal election of human being for covenant, which is the “true 
order of being,” and its actualization in present human life. What has been called 
actualism in Barth scholarship is more often discussed in Barth’s own work using words 
such as “event,” “happening,” and “history.”  
Actualization complements the covenant character of Barth’s ontology but, in order to 
understand Barth properly, it is also important to note how the actualistic character of 
ontology requires covenant. Nimmo contrasts actualistic ontology with “substantialistic” 
ontology.155 That which defines human existence is not a static substance, but rather who 
and what humans are in and through the active events of their lives. In itself, then, an 
actualistic ontology defines existence in relation to that which is acted upon. Taken alone, 
actualism might be said to imply a certain self-fashioning ontology. However, as clearly 
indicated by Barth’s theocentrism, this is not the type of human ontology he has in mind. 
According to Webster, “Barth’s point is more that to be a human person is not simply to 
produce oneself in a process of self-shaping, but rather to discover oneself within an 
ordered reality which is governed by God’s dealings with creation in Jesus Christ.”156 
Similarly, McCormack asserts that while actualism is a helpful term philosophically, “[i]t 
would be even more accurate […] to express Barth’s ontology theologically as a 
‘covenant ontology,’ since it is not in ‘relationality’ in general that […] being is 
constituted but in a most concrete, particular relation,”157 that of the divine-human 
covenant.  
Following from these observations, “true” human ontology becomes actualized in the 
history of each Christian life, in accordance with its foundation in the election of Jesus 
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Christ,158 but the human is not self-governing in respect of this actualization; rather, 
Christ, in the Holy Spirit, actualizes human being. One possible danger here is that the 
consequences of human action might be understood as meaningless and thus human 
action in itself futile and irrelevant in the overall scheme of God’s activity in the 
world.159 Clearly, this would prevent any affirmation that the execution of the task of 
witness is necessary to and definitive of Christian life.  
2.2.2.3 Ontology in Union 
Barth’s ontological grounding of the controlling principle of Christian existence does, 
however, make room for and necessitate human witness, in that Christ unites his action 
with that of the Christian, in what Barth calls “a community of action.”160 Barth writes, 
“[t]heir fellowship would not be complete if their relationship were actualized only from 
above downwards and not also from below upwards. […] [Jesus’]  action has its 
correspondence in an action of the Christian.”161 In this way, God both allows and 
commands human witness to truly participate in divine self-witness in a way that is 
meaningful and necessary.  
The actualistic character of Barth’s ontology has the consequence that the union of Christ 
and the Christian is a “community of action” and not a merging of substances, and so 
Christian life must be characterized by an ongoing active relationship with God.162 This 
means, in Barth’s words, that the Christian “constantly returns to Him as the One who 
lives for him and in him in this form, continually looking and moving forward from this 
place and this place alone.”163 Because the Christian is not identical with Christ in their 
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union, the Christian is “always in movement between two states of existence from the 
subordinate, static, and present of herself, to the superior, dynamic and future in 
Christ.”164 This movement indicates, on a practical level, the shape that witness must 
take. 
Witness occurs primarily in faith, obedience and prayer. The movement between the two 
states of existence, described above, happens in faithful prayer and obedience, which as 
Nimmo rightly asserts “can never be substantialistically predicated of the ethical agent.”  
Similarly, McCormack speaks of “the posture of prayer,” in which “true humanity is 
actualized by faith and in obedience.”165 Clearly, Christian witness, by virtue of its very 
character as witness, involves an orientation of Christians towards other people, and so 
cannot consist only in a vertical relationship of prayer. Caroline Schröder describes the 
interrelatedness of faith, prayer and obedience in Christian life as “the unity of truth and 
actuality […]. These characteristics of Christian existence cannot be reduced to each 
other, but mutually interpret one another.”166 
We can fill out the meaning of this mutual interpretation a bit more by turning to Barth’s 
subsection “The Liberation of the Christian,” at the end of §71. For Barth, prayer is the 
practice of confessing “the dynamic lordship of God over all things,”167 such that 
Christian witness can take place in the confidence of this lordship, rather than in anxiety 
[Angst]. The Christian will still experience anxiety, as part of the “subordinate, static, and 
present of herself,”168 but she is not possessed by it, because in prayer, she is continually 
reminded of who she is in Christ.169 Acting continually from this posture of prayer, the 
Christian may faithfully witness to God without fear or worry about whether or not what 
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she is doing is “correct,” according to some “theory of life,” which has been imposed 
upon her by herself or others.170 Obedience, in this respect, does not consist in 
compliance with a given morality, but rather, “the most immediate act of obedience is 
always the step in his service as a witness which is now demanded of him.”171 
Additionally, the nature of the union between Christ and Christian further emphasizes the 
point that Christian witness to others must occur with a sense of openness and humility. 
Christians do not in any way possess Christ in their being, and so “no man who is called 
does not also have to see and understand himself as one who has still to be called and 
therefore as one who stands alongside and in solidarity with the uncalled.”172 Nimmo 
also draws this connection between actualistic ontology and Christian witness, noting that 
all humanity, including Christian humanity, is fragile.173 He suggests, furthermore, that 
actualistic ontology “demands that Christians remain absolutely open to the fact that 
realization in human action of the will of God is not confined to the Church,” and so 
Christians must always be prepared to listen and learn from those outside of the Christian 
community.174 This humility with respect to others does not contradict the confidence 
with which Christian witness must also proceed, because both proceed from faith in 
divine lordship over all things. Christians are not confident by virtue of something which 
is theirs to possess and lord over others, but because they know that God has reconciled 
humanity to himself in Christ. Likewise, they are humble because they respect God’s 
freedom in his lordship over all humanity, not because they are unsure of themselves in 
relation to others.   
With this understanding of Barth’s actualistic covenant ontology in mind, we can now 
turn to another feature of Barth’s concept of witness – its occurrence in and relationship 
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to history. The end of the discussion of ontology begins to hint at the way witness – this 
controlling principle of the structure of Christian existence – actually happens in the 
course of human lives, through faith, prayer, and obedience. Now we take into 
consideration how Barth understands these human actions to relate to history and bear 
witness within it.  
2.2.3 Witness Borne in History  
Barth’s understanding of history is complex and analysis of it could easily be taken in 
many directions. In order to stay focussed on the concept of witness which is under study 
here, I will ground the present discussion in this passage from §71:  
When this call [to Christian life] comes to man, man’s time is fulfilled and 
a new history begins in his history – an actual time of grace and history of 
salvation. This history is not merely internal but external; it is not merely 
spiritual but moral, social and political; it is not merely invisible but also 
visible. And in the world around him, even though its newness and 
particularity may not be understood but misunderstood without faith, and 
even though it may not be noticed, this history will at least call for notice, 
and […] will certainly not be without relevance and significance for the 
history of this world around and for human history generally. It will thus 
be a history which itself makes history. It will certainly take place in the 
spiritual sphere, yet not in this alone. […] As the called or Christians may 
thus live this part of earthly life among others, not of themselves but by 
God’s eternal election of grace, by the actively known grace of 
reconciliation and the covenant, by the power of the Word and Spirit of 
the living Jesus Christ, it is completely ruled out that they either should or 
could flee from time and history and live properly and essentially in a non-
spatial and timeless beyond. In his this-worldly time and history among all 
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other men, the Christian lives properly and essentially as one who is 
called.175 
To begin, this passage emphasizes the outward, public, and social character of Christian 
life. This is not surprising, as “witness” can clearly not take place in a sort of inner 
monologue or completely private religious life.176 Yet what can the significance of 
Christian witness through history be if God has already made the eternal decision of 
covenant relationship with humanity and fulfilled it through reconciliation in Christ? 
Indeed, the passage itself says that the newness and particularity of Christian life may not 
even be noticed, much less understood by others. George Hunsinger writes, “[a]lthough 
[the saving work of Jesus Christ] indeed continues, it does not go on as a cumulative 
process […].”177Christians cannot add or take anything away from this saving. If this is 
the case, what, then can be the “significance and relevance” of Christian witness?  
According to the passage, Christian witness occurs “by God’s eternal election of grace, 
by the actively known grace of reconciliation and the covenant, by the power of the Word 
and Spirit of the living Jesus Christ.”178 Christian witness is relevant because the power 
of the Spirit of the living Christ is relevant and is in this witness, and this is one of the 
ways in which the saving work of Jesus Christ does continue. Because God chooses to 
reveal himself through human witness in history, this witness will be noticed according to 
his eternal will to be humanity’s covenant partner.    
An article on Barth’s doctrine of the Holy Spirit by George Hunsinger is particularly 
helpful in explaining how Christ’s ongoing work in history, including our present time, 
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relates to the eternal election of Christ. Hunsinger writes of the “complex temporality” 
that relates revelation and reconciliation in Barth’s work: “Revelation and reconciliation 
each centred inalienably on what had taken place in the life history of Jesus Christ then 
and there, while yet involving receptive, eucharistic, and participatory moments, 
continually, here and now.”179  
The tension between past and present, however, need not be an insurmountable obstacle 
if we understand, along with revelation and reconciliation, the Holy Spirit’s work as 
redeemer. “Redemption,” writes Hunsinger “as the peculiar and proper work of the Spirit 
represented the consummation of all things […], was the absolute future which would at 
once reveal and impart Jesus Christ in his inexhaustible significance for the whole 
creation.”180 Thus, the Holy Spirit, which is always Christ’s spirit, works in human 
history between the horizons of reconciliation and redemption. The importance of 
temporality in Barth’s understanding of Christian witness will be developed further in the 
conclusion of this thesis.  
The Holy Spirit, according to Barth, is “the divine power” of Jesus Christ, the Word of 
God, such that “without ceasing to be the Lord or forfeiting his transcendence, but rather 
in its exercise, He gives and imparts Himself to [the Christian],” and this “becomes the 
most truly distinctive feature of [the Christian], the centre and basis of his human 
existence, […] the origin of his freest volition and action […].”181As we have already 
discussed in relation to ontology, the Holy Spirit imparts an “active knowledge” to the 
Christian person. A closer look at this concept of active knowledge is necessary in order 
to clarify how it can possibly translate into acts of witness that are not merely internal, 
spiritual, and invisible, but also external, moral, political, social and visible, as witness 
must be in human history.  
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The knowledge to which Christians are awakened in their call by Christ, through the 
Holy Spirit, Barth writes, “is no mere apprehension and understanding of God’s being 
and action, nor as such a kind of intuitive contemplation. It is the claiming not only of his 
thinking but also of his willing and work, of the whole man, for God. It is his 
refashioning to be a theatre, witness and instrument of his acts.”182 The “active 
knowledge” of which Barth speaks is therefore not “knowledge,” as we typically 
understand it, by any means.183 
While the Holy Spirit unites the Christian to Christ in such a way that makes it possible 
for the human to bear faithful witness to him, what are the concrete actions by which this 
witness occurs? This question presents many difficulties. As discussed throughout this 
chapter, Barth consistently disallows the possibility that humans can pin down or possess 
any “correct” system of beliefs or rules for moral behaviour. Barth writes, “To be sure, 
the counsel which [the Christian] is now given [by Jesus Christ] is not a theory of life. It 
is in his indecision […], that man constructs and has theories. Delivered from indecision, 
the Christian is led at once beyond all theory to practice, to action,” and this action 
consists in “the most immediate act of obedience.”184 To accept that witness must be 
borne of the union of Christ with the Christian, that only the power of the Holy Spirit can 
guarantee the human witness will be faithful to God’s self-witness – all of this is 
threatening to human self-control. And yet it is only in surrendering this control, Barth 
suggests, and in fact rejoicing in this lack of control, that real witness is made possible.185  
The idea that the content of human witness will always be provided by the Holy Spirit 
might, at a superficial glance, appear to suggest that there is no value in developing 
“Christian” attitudes, participating in “Christian” practices, or even speaking about 
“Christian” things, because what will or will not be “Christian” in a given moment is 
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impossible to ascertain. Speaking of those who would accuse Barth of this “ethical 
occasionalism,” Joseph Mangina writes, “Just as we cannot ‘have’ grace, so we cannot 
‘have’ advance knowledge of what God requires of us.”186 This criticism of Barth is 
overstated, as Mangina goes on to discuss, because it does not adequately take into 
account Barth’s understanding of human history, especially as this history relates to 
God’s covenant faithfulness.187  
We have spoken of an active knowledge, that embodies the whole person and in which 
Christ is immediately present to the Christian in the power of the Holy Spirit. Returning 
to the passage from §71, however, Barth speaks not of an empty knowledge, or 
indeterminate presence but rather knowledge of the “grace of reconciliation and the 
covenant, by the power of the Word and Spirit of the living Jesus Christ.”188 Indeed, the 
means by which humans can have any knowledge of who or what God is, is because 
Jesus Christ entered into human history and revealed God’s character as the God of 
grace. The “Spirit” who imparts power to Christian witness is not an alien or strange 
force that comes over a person and compels him to arbitrary behaviours, it is the Spirit of 
this same Jesus Christ who Christians know as gracious. Hunsinger writes, “[Christ’s] life 
as lived in the Spirit cannot be separated from his earthly history. […] As the one who 
lives in the Spirit, the risen Lord imparts himself to ourselves – and his history to our 
histories.”189 In this sense active knowledge, though not typical, is still active knowledge 
about a particular and concrete person and event.  
Furthermore, the determination of God to be in covenant partnership with humanity 
applies to real human beings who only exist in history. So, the Spirit of Christ who acts in 
communion with contemporary Christians is the same Spirit who has always acted 
through humans to bear witness to himself. Following from these observations, the 
particularity with which God encounters humans (both in the earthly life of Jesus and 
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continuously in the lives of individuals), according to Barth, is not mystifying but 
concrete.  Even though God cannot be captured by human systems or “theories of life,” 
he is not beyond reach, because he chooses to reveal himself in history, and chooses to 
act through human witness as well.  
According to Mangina, Barth’s relentless use of “the language of acts and actions,” 
which Mangina suggests garners the criticism of occasionalism, primarily reflects a use 
of conceptual tools that does not adequately match his clear grasp of the subject matter at 
hand (“continuities in our existence”).190 The relationship between acts and actions, and 
continuities in existence will be explored in subsequent chapters. For now, we can note 
that the potential occasionalism in Barth’s view of witness does not entail a lack of 
concreteness or direction. Barth provides many examples of the particularity with which 
God calls people to bear witness to himself and how this witness functions in history.  
Specifically, Barth embarks on a lengthy analysis of diverse passages of “call to witness” 
in Scripture, both of “the prophets of Yahweh in the Old Testament and the disciples and 
apostles of Jesus Christ in the New.”191 Barth discusses, for example, Moses’ call to lead 
his people out of Egypt,192 Jeremiah’s call to tell the people of Jerusalem’s fall “in flat 
opposition to all optimistic prognoses,”193 and the disciples’ call to follow Jesus, and in a 
“highly practical” way, to recognize his existence and commit to it.194 Notably, all of 
these calls are personal in the sense that they are addressed to a (human) person by a 
(divine) person, Yahweh or Jesus Christ; they all discharge a particular task to the person 
called; and they all participate in the history of salvation.195  
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It is significant to note that the contemporaries of these biblical figures may not have 
recognized or understood their witness. By extension, it is possible to see how witnesses 
through all of history, up to the present day, may go unrecognized by their 
contemporaries and yet still have “relevance and significance for the history of this 
world,” as our passage suggests. It follows for Christian witness today, not only that it 
cannot be measured according to some human scale of effectiveness, but also that the 
expectations with which Christians engage in witness should be oriented towards 
faithfulness to God, rather than human outcomes.  
Barth’s scriptural analysis also shows that the ways in which individuals are called to 
witness and the specific tasks set before them are incredibly varied. Although “witness” 
is often associated with the linguistic communication of the gospel message, this is only 
one aspect of witness, and may not be the primary mode by which all Christians are 
called to bear witness. In fact, Barth writes of the biblical calls to witness, “it is only with 
them [the prophets in the narrower sense, aside from Moses and Samuel], that word, 
speech and writing, i.e. declaration in the more literal sense, may be said to stand in the 
forefront of their task and sending.”196 Likewise, he writes, “[…] obeying Him, [the 
Christian] confesses Him, again not just theoretically – and whether or not in words is 
only a secondary question – but quite unequivocally by publicly entertaining the way 
which is chosen by Him, by irrevocably and bindingly accepting his own relationship to 
Him […].”197 
This variability in the way people are called to witness reflects the always personal and 
particular origin of this call in the ongoing life of Christ in the Spirit. As Hunsinger 
writes, “[t]he work of the Holy Spirit, as Barth saw it, is […] diversified in application. 
Divine activity is so richly diverse that it cannot be captured by any law, but must 
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continually be sought afresh from one new situation to the next.”198 This of course, does 
not mean that words are insignificant. 
Repeatedly, Barth refers to Christian witnesses as Verbi divini ministri,199 or ministers of 
the divine Word. Christians bear witness to the Word – Jesus Christ – and not to a mere 
symbol of faith,200 or elevated human consciousness,201 and so the historical narrative 
through which humans learn about Christ’s reconciling work does matter.  However, 
proclamation of this narrative is not necessarily the way in which all Christians will be 
called to bear witness to this Word. Christians are called to be ministers of the divine 
Word, not necessarily, and certainly not only ministers of words. Again, this assertion 
encourages a shift in the expectations of what witness might look like, from a human 
perspective. Importantly, I would suggest, it poses a strong challenge to any purely 
intellectual formulation of Christianity, and demonstrates that those who are not gifted 
with words, including those who might be disabled, can also serve as Christ’s witnesses. 
At the same time, Barth is certainly not anti-intellectual in his conception of Christian 
witness.202 
Not all Christians are called to bear witness to Christ through verbal proclamation of the 
gospel. Furthermore, according to Barth, reception, understanding, and belief in the 
biblical narrative do not of themselves make a person into a Christian. No story or person 
can actually mediate the call of Christ.203 However, the biblical narrative remains 
normative for all forms of witness because through it, Christ has chosen to reveal himself 
as the God of grace for humanity.204 Barth writes:  
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It is by [the witness of the prophets and apostles] that the Lord who is 
normative for all proclaims and makes Himself known […]. Yet it is not 
their power which is at work. […] Even in Holy Scripture as such there is 
no inherent force. It is wholly and immediately His power and work if, 
attested by them, He now issues His call to others as once He did to them. 
The others are normatively taught and instructed concerning Him by them 
as the first to be called. To that extent they are bound to their witness as 
the criterion, though not the source, of their knowledge.205 
This quote exemplifies how Scriptural narrative relates to the work of Christ up to this 
day, without Christ’s being restricted by it. Because Christ has revealed his character, 
being, and will through his actions, and the apostles were the first witnesses of these 
actions, we can and must trust Scriptural witness, though we can never confuse Christ 
himself with the witness to him attested in Scripture.  
The reasoning extends to post-biblical witnesses as well: “[…]if this has to be said in 
relation to the prophets and apostles as the first to be called, it applies self-evidently to all 
the secondary witnesses of Jesus Christ who follow them, whether we think of His 
community as such or of the bearers of special offices of ministry within it.”206 The 
community that understands Scripture as the normative criterion for their knowledge of 
Christ, namely the Christian community, will witness according to this criterion, but the 
living Christ retains ultimate power over his own self-revelation, in the shape this witness 
may take.   
Barth’s retention of a clear separation between the “Christian message” and Christ 
himself has serious implications for Christian witness. This separation means that 
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Christ’s Spirit and work is not constrained to the Christian community, nor, by any means 
does every Christian action bear faithful witness.207 As mentioned earlier, humility and 
openness are thus necessary in Christian witness to others. Christ may, indeed, bear 
witness to Christians through these others!  
Furthermore, it is difficult to distinguish between what is Scripturally evident and what is 
a given community’s interpretation of Scripture. This is particularly dangerous in 
communities where Scripture and Christ are confounded, because “witness” risks 
becoming an attempt to conform others to, or coerce others into accepting, one’s own 
interpretation of what Christianity must “look like.” Not only do humans attempt to usurp 
Christ’s lordship in such situations, but it can also lead to devastating forms of cultural 
oppression.208 On the other hand, as Hunsinger suggests, “[Christ] must continually be 
seen and appreciated in new light and new aspects. […] The indivisible wholeness of his 
work, and in this work his being, is not uniform but multiform in itself.”209 Similarly, 
reflecting on the plurality of witnesses found even in the Bible itself, Franke writes, “the 
self-revelatory speech-act of God is received among diverse communities over long 
periods of time and in a plurality of cultural settings. The human reception and response 
is shaped by the communal and cultural settings in which revelation occurs. This is part 
of the act of revelation itself that creates its own hearers […].”210Again, this calls to mind 
the recurring theme, in Barth’s theology, of surrendering human control of witness to 
Christ, and shifting expectations of what the outcome of witness might be. 
2.3 Chapter Conclusion 
While much more could be said about Karl Barth’s understanding of Christian witness, 
this chapter has attempted to show that, in Barth’s theology, witness is the defining 
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characteristic of Christian life. As the encounter between the living Christ and human 
beings cannot be systematized, predicted, or controlled, Christians are called only to bear 
witness to Jesus Christ, the history of whom has taught and continues to teach them not 
only of their own reconciliation to God, but also of the world’s. Humbly, shaped by the 
scriptural witness to Christ and Christian witness throughout history, and always with 
prayerful attention to the Holy Spirit, Christians can live, work and speak as those who 
know Christ as Lord.    
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Chapter 3  
3 A Critical Appraisal of Barth’s Concept of Witness 
Now that we have explored the christological foundation of Barth’s understanding of 
witness and examined in some detail his unique understanding of the Christian as 
witness, this study will turn to a critical appraisal of what has been laid out so far, largely 
through a consideration of major themes in the scholarly reception and criticism of this 
material. This appraisal cannot be exhaustive; its purpose is to draw attention to some of 
the difficulties and ambiguities in Barth’s understanding of witness.  
I will proceed by considering three related issues in Barth’s theology: 1) the genuineness 
or reality of humanity; 2) human possibilities for meaningful witness; and 3) the self- 
understanding of the Christian witness, particularly as it is related to sin. Again, the 
analysis of Barth’s concept of witness here will be restricted to his treatment of the 
individual person rather than the church as witness, in view of the immense scope of the 
latter in the Church Dogmatics. 
As will become apparent throughout this chapter, the christological foundation (outlined 
in chapter one), on which Barth bases his understanding of Christian witness (outlined in 
chapter two), largely shapes the scholarly discussion of the three issues identified above. 
However, this christological focus is not restricted to Barth’s discussion of Christian 
witness, rather, it permeates the Church Dogmatics in such a way that scholarly criticism, 
appreciation, or understanding of Barth’s christological methodology affects the scholarly 
response to all aspects of his theology.  
I raise this point because this chapter will make reference to scholarship that does not 
specifically discuss Barth’s theology of vocation or witness but rather discusses his 
theological method or his ethics more broadly. Albeit cautiously, deductions can be made 
about Barth’s theology of vocation and witness from these broader assessments because 
of the methodological consistency and interconnectedness between the range of doctrines 
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and their ethical implications in Church Dogmatics.211 With this in mind, the analysis of 
three key issues surrounding Barth’s understanding of witness and vocation can proceed.     
3.1 The Reality and Genuineness of Humanity  
As has been illustrated throughout this thesis, Barth grounds reconciliation, both in its 
objective basis and subjective basis, in Jesus Christ. Vocation, Barth suggests, is the call 
of Christ “by which He awakens man to an active knowledge of the truth and thus 
receives him into the new standing of the Christian […].”212 This call belongs to the 
reconciling activity of Christ, alongside justification and sanctification. As discussed in 
chapter 2, the truth, to which the Christian is awakened by this call, is that Jesus Christ 
has decisively reconciled all of humanity to God through his life, death, and resurrection, 
in fulfillment of God’s eternal election of humanity, in Jesus Christ, to be God’s covenant 
partner. The call to active knowledge of this truth, furthermore, is a call to the task of 
witnessing to “[Christ’s] being in His past, present and future action in the world and in 
history, of His being in His acts among and upon men.”213 Barth’s depiction of Christian 
existence as defined by witness to a certain ontological state of affairs (or ‘reality’), 
established and maintained by and in the person of Jesus Christ, raises questions about 
how Barth understands the reality of humanity in and of itself;214 it seems to create a 
divide between that which is really real and that which only appears to be real.  
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To address such concerns, theological supporters of Barth tend to reframe these questions 
and challenge their underlying assumptions. For instance, the ontologically determinative 
being-in-act of Jesus Christ, John Webster suggests, only threatens human reality if the 
contingencies of history are understood to be determinative of the “real” in an exclusive 
manner.215 Webster goes on to say, “Barth is not claiming that God in Christ is ‘the 
reality’ in an exclusive sense, in a way which amounts to an ontological 
disenfranchisement of all other ‘realities’. The reality of Jesus Christ as the self-positing 
of God includes within itself all other realities, and it is in him and from him that they 
have their inalienable substance.”216 By understanding Barth’s ontological prioritizing of 
Jesus Christ as inclusive of “other ‘realities’,” Webster eschews the issue of whether or 
not Barth treats humanity as real and rather shifts the discussion to the nature of human 
reality and its relationship to divine reality.   
This shift, from understanding reality as defined exclusively by historical contingency to 
understanding historical contingency as reality encompassed within the truth of the 
sovereignly determinative reality of God, carves out the space in which Barth’s 
formulation of Christian existence as witness can logically occur. It does not deny the 
genuine reality of human existence but at the same time it affirms that the most 
significant determinant of reality, Jesus Christ, is not simply equal to human existence. 
Christians, while living and experiencing reality in all their humanness, are encountered 
by the reality of Jesus Christ in such a way that they recognize its significance for human 
history and life and bear testimony to it.  
Barth’s ontological relativization of historical contingencies is accompanied by the 
suggestion that human capacities (for example, cognition and emotion) are not an 
authoritative guide through reality. In chapter 1, I discussed this issue from the 
christological perspective in terms of Jesus Christ’s self-revelation in his prophetic office 
and the distinction between “divine facts” as self-demonstrating and “creaturely facts.” 
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Here, we pick up this issue again in terms of how the content of such self-revelation 
might be said to relate to human experiences of reality.  
If reality was determined by nothing more than the chance happenings of history, then it 
would make sense to conclude that human capacities are fit to find, create, or interpret the 
meaning of this reality. However, as George Hunsinger explains, in Barth’s view of 
reality, “[Truth] is essentially a predicate of God’s own living reality as the Lord. […] It 
is a truth that, at God’s own prerogative (and only at this prerogative), makes itself 
known with power. […] [O]ur human perception and reception of this truth can only be 
an ongoing event. […] God is not knowable as a given entity that can be rationally 
apprehended and thereby controlled.”217 Consequently, Barth’s theology decentres the 
role of human subjectivity from the place it held in Enlightenment theology and holds in 
post-Enlightenment theology.  
This decentring does not mean that Barth denies the reality or genuineness of human 
experience and subjectivity, but rather that he challenges the idea that humans are 
inherently capable of accessing and understanding the truth about reality – the truth of its 
reconciliation to God in Christ. As Mangina writes, “What Barth wants to defeat is the 
abstract subjectivity of human existence considered as an independent quantity […].”218  
Indeed, Barth’s whole definition of Christians as witnesses relies on the presupposition 
that humans can, in some sense, know the truth of the objective reality of reconciliation 
in Christ. Rather than this knowledge being inherently accessible to human perception, 
however, Barth understands not only the knowledge, but also the capacity to know, as 
bestowed in the event of divine grace that occurs in vocation.  
George Hunsinger describes the centrality of knowledge in Barth’s theology of vocation 
as follows, “The Word of the cross comes from without and reveals itself from within. 
Knowledge determines the context in which we are engaged to the full. It sets the stage 
on which all our personal capacities are exercised, not just the cognitive but the affective, 
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volitional, conative, and intuitive as well.”219 By giving these personal capacities “a 
decidedly noetic cast,”220 Barth safeguards God’s sovereignty over the content and 
communication of truth such that the primary human relationship to the divinely 
manifested truth is one of acknowledgement.221 One of the vulnerabilities of 
understanding the relationship of humanly experienced reality to divinely determined 
reality as one of human acknowledgment to divine truth is that the contingent events of 
history, though affirmed as reality in principle, do not actually seem to be affected by the 
supposedly determinative reality of divine truth.  
Such scepticism is represented in the following quote from R.H. Roberts, as cited by 
Webster, “The triumphalist pursuit of hegemony in […] Barth’s ‘God’ risks an 
intellectual absurdity most apparent where the systematic and ontological self-
consistency […] is most complete. Thus […] the third volume of Barth’s Church 
Dogmatics risks[s] reductio ad absurdum as on re-encountering contingency after [its] 
ontological adventures [Barth] face[s] the charge that [he] represent[s] merely the 
seamless rhetoric of transformation rather than an actual analysis of the possibility of 
translation of theory into social reality and practice.”222 Note here that Roberts tacitly 
equates real transformation of social reality with the translation of theory into 
(presumably human) practice.   
Barth himself acknowledges that if Jesus Christ’s lordship consisted in the securing of 
ontological reality (of the “co-existence of the Creator with His Creature”223) with no 
consequences in the world of historical contingencies then his lordship “could not be 
called good news in face of the bitter reality of the disruption and even destruction and 
corruption of this co-existence by the pride and sloth of man, and the whole ensuing 
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disorganisation and misery of the human situation.”224 However, according to Barth, 
Christ “is the Lord and Servant who lives […] for the sake of the creaturely world and 
humanity […]. Hence He does not merely confirm the co-existence of God and man, but 
He creates order in place of the disorder which obtains within it.”225 Notably, in this 
passage, Barth asserts Christ’s ongoing creation of order in the place of disorder.  
While Barth emphasizes divine action in the transformation of social reality, the criticism 
quoted above seeks an articulation of human practices for such transformation. 
Admittedly, I have juxtaposed the two passages for the sake of comparison and contrast 
and so to suggest that the two authors are “talking past one another,” would be a 
contrived argument. Nevertheless, I suggest the comparison does serve to show that what 
might be read as only apparent or ‘rhetorical’ transformation of social reality in Barth’s 
account may actually be more accurately described as Barth’s emphasis on the role of 
divine action over human action in such transformation.  
One cannot reasonably deny that Barth emphasizes and prioritizes divine action over 
human action both in his theology generally and within his account of Christian witness, 
in particular, as this thesis has demonstrated to this point. However, Barth also suggests 
that human action is meaningful and necessary in the covenant partnership between God 
and humanity, to which all humanity is elected and towards which the actualization of 
human history is directed. In fact, as established in chapter 2, Barth claims that such 
human action, in the form of witness, is central to Christian life. Therefore, even if Barth 
does primarily relate true reality and humanly experienced reality to one another by 
attributing the transformation of human history to divine action, the question of whether 
or not he adequately articulates the human role in such transformation remains. We now 
turn to this question.  
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3.2 Human Possibilities for Meaningful Witness 
If, as Barth claims, Christian existence is primarily life in execution of the task of 
witness, the noetic aspect of vocation must be accompanied by action. Without the noetic 
aspect, witness would not be tethered to the objective reality of the truth communicated 
by the Word of Jesus Christ. But without the active aspect, it is difficult to see how 
Christians can be said to truly participate in the ongoing self-witness of Jesus Christ. 
Hunsinger describes the relationship between the noetic and active aspects of Christian 
witness this way: “[T]he truth which is being manifested and acknowledged is precisely 
the truth of one’s personal participation in the salvation wrought by Christ. The truth 
being acknowledged (by faith and not by sight) is thus the truth of being called to 
encounter with Christ, and thus to mutual self-involvement and fellowship with him here 
and now. In this sense, acknowledgment and participation go hand in hand.”226 
According to Barth, it is only in this fellowship with the living Christ that Christian 
witness can actively participate in Christ’s ongoing reconciling work as it occurs in 
human history.  
A first difficulty with the suggestion that Christian witness can only occur in fellowship 
with Jesus Christ is whether or not such witness can be considered genuinely human 
action. If Christ initiates the encounters in which he reveals himself and establishes 
fellowship with humans and, at the same time, meaningful acts of Christian witness can 
only occur on the basis of such fellowship, in what sense are these acts of witness 
properly ‘human’? John Webster notes this difficulty with regard to human moral agency 
in Barth’s work, suggesting that “when Barth appeals (explicitly or implicitly) to ‘being 
in Christ’ or to the ‘vicarious nature of Jesus Christ’s humanity, or to Christ’s 
substitutionary work in our place,” he risks undermining the very “reality of the human 
subject and agent which it seeks to establish,” by his christological doctrine.227 Indeed, 
Barth does not seem to leave a way for the person who is called by Christ to relate to the 
knowledge of Christ as something outside of him or herself.  
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By Barth’s account, because Jesus Christ is not only the objective but also the subjective 
basis of the knowledge of reconciliation, those who find themselves called to it have 
already been transformed by it cognitively, volitionally, emotionally, and in every other 
capacity. So, one might argue, that even the choice to correspond to this knowledge in 
one’s acts is not a human choice in the sense that a person cannot by his or her own 
capacities attain this knowledge or act upon it without having already been transformed 
by it through Christ’s uniting of Himself to the Christian through the divine power of the 
Holy Spirit. 
A second problem with respect to genuine human action in witness appears to be created 
by Barth’s suggestion that fellowship with Christ not only makes Christian witness 
possible, but actually demands it. For instance, Barth writes, “More than [the Christian’s] 
human witness […] is not demanded of him. But the service of his human witness is 
demanded.”228 Or, to take another example, “Being called by and to the Christ engaged 
in the exercise of His prophetic office, [Christians] have no option but to attach 
themselves to Him with their own action, to tread in His steps […].”229 The apparent 
absence of human choice with respect to participation in Christ’s action seems, at least at 
first glance, to smack of determinism or at least compulsion.  
We have so far identified two threats to the genuineness of human action in Barth’s 
account of the Christian as witness, both rooted in his view of Christian “ontology in 
union,” which was introduced in chapter 2; 1) the apparent absence of human choice with 
regard to whether one engages in encounter with Christ, and 2) the apparent absence of 
choice with respect to one’s action within the context of this encounter. Both of these 
‘threats,’ however, rely on certain assumptions, which differ from Barth’s understanding 
about the nature of genuineness and meaning in human action.  
A defense of Barth on these points can be mounted in similar fashion to the defense 
against the charge that he does not accord reality to the world of historical contingencies. 
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Namely, in order to make sense of Barth, one must first understand how he has redefined 
terms in his theology – terms that might have a rather different established or common 
use.   
The inability of the Christian to relate to knowledge of Christ as an object outside of him 
or herself and the Christian’s inability to choose to act within and on the basis of an 
encounter with Christ are threatening to human agency when agency is understood 
primarily in terms of  “deliberative consciousness or spontaneous action,” as is typical of 
modern moral theory.230 This latter understanding of human agency relies on a view of 
reality as historical contingency, which requires humans to make meaning, or to 
determine who and what they will be, in the face of the undirected and not inherently 
meaningful nature of historical events and circumstances.231 Consequently, anything that 
could be seen to inhibit a person’s ability to make such determinations would be 
considered detrimental to human agency. In such a context, human agency is basically set 
in competition with Jesus Christ’s agency232 – where Jesus Christ determines the course 
of things, the human is deprived of his or her ability to determine them.  
Barth, however, understands all reality to be encompassed within the reality of Jesus 
Christ, and so in Barth’s view, human will and choice are not considered “quintessential 
marks of human dignity whose removal spells the end of serious consideration of the 
substance of humanity.”233 On the contrary, because, for Barth, the being-in-act of Christ 
defines what it means to be truly human, the suggestion that Christians, in union with 
Christ, “must” act as witnesses alongside Christ’s self-witness, does not threaten human 
agency, but rather establishes it.  
This suggestion makes sense within the framework of the covenantal ontology (described 
in chapter 2), which is the outworking of Barth’s doctrine of election. In this framework, 
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“the basic, original, and immutable determination of the being of the ethical agent [is] 
that she is with God.”234 Therefore, for Barth, the exercise of human agency in 
fellowship with God is the exercise of genuine human agency. 
Barth’s account of human agency, while redefined, is not entirely dissimilar from other 
accounts that view autonomous self-determination as central to human agency. Just as 
Barth’s prioritizing of Jesus Christ as ontologically determinative of reality does not 
“ontologically disenfranchise”235 historical contingency as reality, but rather conditions 
it, neither does Barth’s view of genuine human agency as operative in union with divine 
agency eliminate human agency.         
In order to understand more fully how Barth construes genuine human agency, we can 
turn to George Hunsinger’s discussion of “‘double agency’ (the coincidence and 
distinction of divine and human agency in a single event).”236 Hunsinger suggests that it 
is critical to understand Barth’s “account of fellowship, [the goal of vocation], in 
particular and of divine and human agency in general […] within the terms of the 
Chalcedonian pattern.”237 The three formal aspects of the pattern are asymmetry, 
intimacy, and integrity.238 All three aspects are demonstrated in the following passage 
from Barth: 
Superfluously, in this glorious sense, [Christians] live only by the fact that 
Christ permits and commands their ministering co-operation, […] not 
denying but granting it His own assistance. And they do in fact live by this 
as those who are called by Him in fellowship with His life and in the 
fellowship of their action with His. […] Nor do they do so in vain, nor 
without meaning and purpose, even though their action can never match 
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up to His. […] Their word can and should reflect the light of His prophetic 
work. It can and should be the sign which accompanies and confirms His 
self-revelation – no more, but also no less […] and for all its dubiety as a 
human work it is a work which is well pleasing to God in His relation to 
the world […].239      
This passage shows that Barth’s view of double agency is asymmetrical in that God’s 
action always takes precedence over human action, ruling and determining it.240 Double 
agency is intimate by virtue of the unity in fellowship between divine and human action, 
“without separation or division.”241 Lastly, double agency demonstrates integrity in that, 
in their coincident operation, both divine agency and human agency operate “without 
confusion or mixture.”242 Barth’s redefinition of genuine human agency, according to the 
Chalcedonian pattern, articulates the role of the Christian witness in transforming reality 
as it relates to Jesus Christ’s role in transforming reality.  
I have attempted to show that despite Barth’s emphasis on divine action in the 
transformation of reality or, to put it differently, his emphasis on Christ’s ongoing acts of 
reconciliation, Barth does also articulate a role for the Christian witness in this 
transformation. He does this through his christological redefinition of human agency. Yet 
this in itself is not sufficient to show that Barth makes a strong connection between the 
ontology of reality as it is divinely determined and reality as it is humanly experienced.  
While Barth’s depiction of double agency describes human capacity for meaningful 
witness in its relationship to Christ’s action, it does not describe this human capacity in 
terms of how the human subject experiences the exercise of this agency. I posit that the 
‘event character’ of grace as truth, as Barth understands it, prevents such description. The 
event character of grace as truth prevents a systematic ‘mapping’ of the objective 
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ontological truth onto reality as humanly experienced and vice versa. Whether this proves 
fatal to Barth’s theology of Christian witness will be explored in the concluding chapter 
of this thesis but before making any conclusions, I will have to first describe how the 
event character of grace as truth intersects with human subjectivity and human acts, 
especially those of the Christian as witness. 
3.3 The Self-Understanding of the Christian Witness  
By this point in the thesis, it has hopefully been well established that, in Barth’s view, the 
active knowledge to which Christians are called in encounter with Jesus Christ cannot be 
grounded in any human capacities; rather, this knowledge is divinely self-authenticating. 
Furthermore, it has been established that this knowledge is self-involving for the person 
called to it, both in the sense of engaging the person in every way (not just cognitively), 
and in the sense of communicating information about that person to themselves (the 
reality of their reconciliation to Christ).  
The following, from George Hunsinger, exemplifies both of these points about active 
knowledge but also highlights that this knowledge, discussed here under the concept of 
grace, occurs only as event: “Grace is […] an event that defies all ordinary 
categorization,”243 and as such, “is the absolute and ongoing miracle in which God 
bestows the capacity, which must ever be sought anew, to so align human volition with 
the divine that God may be served in fellowship and loved.”244 Not only does the event 
of grace enable the alignment of human and divine volition but it also discloses to the 
human agent that this is the case, “Indeed, the knowledge of revelation is itself an 
extension of the miracle, so that perception of the event in its significance is no less 
miraculous than the event itself.”245 When the source of true self-knowledge is construed 
as event, discussion of continuities in knowledge across time and action based on that 
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knowledge becomes complicated. I have gestured towards this difficulty in Barth’s work 
already in chapter 2.  
The event character of self-knowledge affects continuities in knowledge across time and, 
by extension, discussions of what constitutes properly Christian practices of witness and 
attitudes. Mangina, for instance asks how “the self-knowledge entailed in the knowledge 
of God […] relates to the world of ordinary experience.”246 He writes, “[H]ow does one 
‘apply’ the knowledge of self that Barth has been so careful to ground in encounter with 
the risen Lord?”247 Mangina here reminds us that the event character of revelation is 
always the event of an encounter with Jesus Christ, as he lives and works in his prophetic 
office by the Holy Spirit.  
The scope of this study does not allow for the exploration of philosophical and 
theological theories of subjectivity but presumably, it can be reasonably ventured that 
individual subjects do not experience their lives as a series of discontinuous and unrelated 
events, but rather can reflect upon events as they relate to one another in a continuous 
flow of time.  
As we have seen, Barth rejects the suggestion that such self-reflection allows one to 
understand the truth about reality but he does not reject the suggestion that people, 
nonetheless, can and do engage in such reflection. In Barth’s framework, it might be said 
that for the Christian, grace interrupts such reflection as a unique event that discloses 
self-involving knowledge and, in so doing, conditions the Christian’s reflection. In 
Barth’s own words, the Holy Spirit who encounters the Christian in this event of grace, 
“is thus God in His power which enlightens the heart of man, which convicts his 
conscience, which persuades his understanding, which does not win him physically or 
metaphysically from without, but ‘logically’ from within. […] Far from the Christian 
being mastered and taken out of himself […] by the power of the Holy Spirit […] he 
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really comes to himself and may be himself.”248 We can see here that, according to the 
Chalcedonian nature of the union between Christ and Christian discussed above, the 
integrity of the human person is maintained so that the event of grace does not “force” the 
Christian’s thought and action. In other words, Christians still have freedom of choice, 
even if this freedom of choice does not form the basis of genuine human agency.  
It follows that Christ’s disclosure of his self-involving truth in grace, does not only allow 
the Christian to understand her actions as conforming to Christ’s self-witness, but also to 
understand that her actions at times contradict Christ’s self-witness. Hunsinger writes, “In 
the absolute miracle of grace, the radical incapacity of the creature [to be self-
determining] is at once relentlessly disclosed and mercifully overcome.”249This truth may 
condition or inform the Christian’s self-reflection such that she may faithfully learn and 
change her thoughts and behaviours over time. Nevertheless, the Christian will never 
possess the truth in such a way that she can master it and thus guarantee that every act 
will prove to be faithful in its witness to Christ. 
Under this interpretation the disjunction between the ontological reality of Christians as 
active witnesses and the human experience of free choice does not result from Barth’s 
failure to conceptualize the relationship between ontology and reality as humans 
experience it. Rather, it results from the material consideration of human sin as a factor in 
reality.250 Barth himself certainly recognizes the impact of sin (as he understands it) on 
theology (as he writes it). He says, “[Theology] can never form a system, comprehending 
and as it were ‘seizing’ the object,” because “the existence, presence, and operation of 
nothingness […] are also objectively the break in the relationship between Creator and 
creature. […] And this means that theological thought and utterance must always be 
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broken.”251 As it is well beyond the scope of this project to enter into a detailed 
discussion of Barth’s doctrine of sin, in what follows, I will simply be sketching some 
contours of it to further show how, in Barth’s work, sin distorts the relationship between 
human self-understanding and the truth of human being as it is established in Christ.  
A clarification of what Barth means when he writes of “the existence, presence and 
operation of nothingness”252 will help to introduce the way that Barth thinks about sin. 
Church Dogmatics §50 is titled “God and Nothingness,”253 and in the thesis at the head 
of this section, Barth writes, “[…] nothingness is inimical to the will of the Creator and 
therefore to the nature of His good creature. God has judged nothingness by His mercy as 
revealed and effective in Jesus Christ.”254 While the word “nothingness” might seem 
bizarre in this context, if one reads this quote replacing “nothingness” with the word 
“sin,” one is left with a relatively orthodox sentence about sin.  
Indeed, Barth discusses sin under the concept of nothingness and, for the purposes of this 
project, the two terms are basically interchangeable. For the sake of clarity, I will add that 
for Barth, the concept of nothingness includes more than what might be signalled by sin 
as it is commonly understood; for instance it includes, “the whole complex of sin, guilt 
and punishment, the whole reality of calamity, suffering and death.”255 The word 
nothingness also indicates Barth’s view of the place sin occupies within the framework of 
God’s rule and determination of reality. Because sin is against God’s will, it simply does 
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not “make sense” for it to occur. Mangina puts it tersely; “Sin is absurd.”256 Barth’s 
doctrine of election and the covenantal ontology stemming from it, which we explored in 
chapter 2, indicate that God’s sovereign decision to be the covenant partner of humanity 
cannot be contradicted. The ongoing occurrence of sin in the world, therefore, cannot be 
explained or accounted for; it has already been judged and overcome as nothingness by 
the reconciliation accomplished in Christ.  
It is possible to suggest that if, from a theological perspective, sin and its effects are still 
clearly evident in the world then Barth’s view of sin as already judged is at the very least 
inaccurate, if not dangerous in its failure to take sin seriously. Such a reading of Barth 
would be mistaken. Barth does not deny sin’s reality; rather, “It ‘is’ not as God and His 
creation are, but only in its own improper way, as an inherent contradiction, as 
impossible possibility.”257The purpose of describing sin this way, instead of starting 
theological reflection on it from the perspective of sin’s very evident possibility and 
reality, is because as Barth understands it, there is a Word that speaks louder than sin’s 
reality – and that is the Word of God in Christ.258 Christ, in his prophetic office, declares 
that even though sin is real, its ultimate power over humanity has been defeated in 
reconciliation. In speaking of sin as nothingness, Barth is, therefore, attempting to avoid 
“an uneasy, bleak and sceptical overestimation of its power in relation to God, or […] an 
easy, comfortable and dogmatic underestimation of its power in relation to us.”259   
This brief introduction to Barth’s view of sin sets the stage for a closer examination of the 
way in which sin presents an epistemological problem to the Christian’s self-
understanding as witness and, therefore, the apparent disconnect in Barth’s theology 
between his confident descriptions of reality as it is in Christ and reality as it is 
experienced.  
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In the first chapter, I represented the triadic structure of Barth’s doctrine of reconciliation 
in table 1. Barth relates each aspect of the doctrine to a specific dimension of human sin: 
justification to humanity’s pride, sanctification to humanity’s sloth, and vocation to 
humanity’s falsehood. Of course, just as with the inalienability of the “What” from the 
“How” of reconciliation, discussed at length in chapter 1, so too are these dimensions of 
sin intimately connected. For instance, Barth does not suggest that Jesus Christ reconciles 
humanity in its pride through justification, leaving sloth and falsehood untouched. The 
“unity and totality” of sin,260 just like the unity and totality of reconciliation, cannot be 
separated but can be considered from different angles in order to draw a fuller theological 
picture.  
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the aspect of sin that most clearly expresses the problem it 
presents for Christian witness is the aspect associated with Jesus Christ in his prophetic 
work of vocation – the falsehood of humanity. Falsehood, writes Barth, is “the disguise 
or mask which the man of sin at once assumes when he is confronted by Jesus Christ the 
true Witness, and which is torn off again the course of this encounter.”261 Here again, we 
see the idea of the event of encounter with Jesus Christ as central. Where truth is 
disclosed dynamically in event, it might be said that falsehood or “untruth”262 is more 
static. To continue with Barth’s metaphor, falsehood is a mask that truth-as-event must 
tear off. However, the person wearing the mask does not even recognize that he is 
wearing it until it has been torn off. That is to say, the only way humans come to see 
themselves as sinners is within the context of the event of the encounter between God and 
humanity in Jesus Christ, as both Joseph Mangina and George Hunsinger point out.263 
Therefore, knowledge of the self as sinner can never be systematized such that it can be 
apprehended and explained outside of this encounter.264 Mangina explains the 
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vulnerability of Barth’s view of sin in terms of its implications for human self-knowledge 
as follows, “the eventful or ‘I-Thou’ character of the knowledge of sin might seem to call 
into question its very character as knowledge.”265 This is essentially the same point I 
made above regarding the event character of grace as truth being problematic for the 
continuous nature of human self-reflection. Rightly so, as Barth understands “knowledge 
of sin” to belong to the truth revealed in grace. Why is this problematic?  
Mangina draws a comparison between Barth’s view of sin and the Kierkegaardian 
school’s view of sin, which will help to answer this question.266 Mangina suggests that 
the Kierkegaardian school “offers experiential content to the doctrine [of sin]” by 
discussing it in terms of concepts such as freedom and anxiety. In doing so, it “helps us to 
locate sin on a map of the self.”267 On the other hand, as we have seen, Barth thinks sin is 
contradictory to true personhood (defined by Christ) and therefore refuses to locate it on 
the map of the self.268 We can return to the mask metaphor here – the mask of falsehood 
does not properly belong to the person and so it makes little sense to describe falsehood 
in terms of what constitutes human being.  
However, if one cannot describe falsehood in terms of the self, the question of how one’s 
self can behave in relation to the truth becomes difficult to answer. Mangina frames the 
question this way, “Can my self-understanding as a sinner be spelled out in such a way 
that I can make sense of my own experience, behaviour, and situatedness in the 
world?”269 This is the point at which Barth’s christological re-description of reality and 
human agency as truly reconciled fails to translate clearly into terms of human 
experience. Again, there is a close relationship between the possibility of an active 
human response to truth and the possibility of knowing oneself as a sinner. Both 
                                                
265
 Ibid.  
266
 Note that I am neither accepting or rejecting Mangina’s reading of the Kierkegaardian view on sin. The 
point in citing this comparison is, rather, to use it as a foil to Barth’s view.   
267
 Mangina, Christian Life, 95.  
268
 Ibid.  
269
 Ibid. 
72 
 
possibilities lie outside the regular apprehension of humans, and so day-to-day life goes 
on with humans using the knowledge available to them through regular perception and 
reflection to make decisions and behave in certain ways rather than others. For Barth, one 
cannot escape one’s own falsehood or untruth and therefore one cannot possibly know, 
through one’s regular human capacities, whether or not one is living as a faithful 
witness.270 Based on this assertion, it is easy to appreciate the criticism that Barth’s view 
of the Christian as witness leads to the interpretation of Christian action as essentially 
futile.   
Yet Barth does not understand regular human capacities as inherently bad.271 They 
belong to the humanity that God has chosen as covenant partner. Barth’s refusal to locate 
the source of falsehood on ‘the map of the self,’ is not, therefore, a rejection of the map 
altogether. According to Barth, theologies that do carefully attempt to pin down sin tend 
also to clearly delineate what is required of the Christian qua Christian. In doing so, they 
claim power over sin which is not theirs to claim, but which has already been claimed by 
Christ in his defeat of sin.272 This point is key to understanding the delimitations of 
Barth’s theology of witness, and requires some elaboration. 
Barth suggests that while all humans live in the “untruth active in all human belief, 
superstition and error,”273“falsehood is the specifically Christian form of sin.”274 In the 
lives of Christians, falsehood “reache[s] maturity” because as those who have been 
encountered by Jesus Christ in his prophesy as the Holy Spirit, Christians continue to 
mount their own beliefs through their own efforts, knowing that these beliefs can never 
supplant the truth, as much as they might resemble it.275 In this sense, all Christian 
attempts to speak of the God who has encountered them are but “an image which is 
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defaced, distorted and corrupted.”276 In falsehood, Christians attempt to draw boundaries 
and to provide concrete answers where it is impossible for them to do so. Barth writes, 
“The image in which the reality of man represents itself in his untrue situation provides 
no answer but continually leads him astray. In relation both to his fellow-men and to the 
cosmos it speaks only of a co-existence which is constantly transformed into an empty 
proximity and even hostility.”277 In chapter 2, we saw some examples of theologies that, 
in Barth’s estimation, are capable of unintentionally creating hostility on the part of 
Christians towards others – the privileging of either the Christian ethos or the Christian 
experience of salvation as structuring principles of Christian existence.  
At the same time as Barth claims Christian speech can only be “untruth” by comparison 
with the truth revealed in and by Jesus Christ, he also claims that the task of Christian 
witness must continue. This is the paradox inherent in theological speech and existence; 
what from one angle is the human response of witness demanded by the encounter with 
Christ is, from another angle, inevitably falsehood.  
Barth certainly does not exempt himself from the charge of falsehood.278 However, by 
the manner in which he makes witness the controlling principle of the structure of 
Christian life, Barth does aim to constantly defer to the authority and activity of Jesus 
Christ, rather than claiming such authority himself. He does so based on the conviction 
that the decision of election, accomplishment of reconciliation, and ongoing prophetic 
declaration of “Jesus Christ as the true Witness infallibly differentiates falsehood from 
truth.”279  
3.4  Chapter Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have attempted to critically analyze Barth’s understanding of the 
Christian as witness in terms of the interpretive difficulties it presents; particularly, the 
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seriousness with which Barth takes human reality and the understanding of genuine 
human agency in light of his christological re-description of reality. I have suggested that 
the persistent disconnect between ontology and experienced reality in Barth’s theology 
can be traced to his understanding of sin as a human phenomenon and to a particular form 
of falsehood as the specifically Christian sin.280 Here, I posit that the disconnect can be 
attributed to what Barth sees as a human reality (i.e., the reality of sin) in need of 
theological attestation, rather than the disconnect resulting from a conceptual failure on 
Barth’s part.  
If we accept Barth’s view of sin as affecting the self-knowledge of the Christian, such 
that it is impossible to apprehend and therefore ‘manage’ the human witness to the truth 
of Jesus Christ in practice, the question remains as to how Barth’s theology can 
reasonably be said to justify, encourage, and sustain practices of active Christian witness.    
In the next and final chapter, I will suggest that a renewed and distinctive emphasis on 
the theme of Christian hope in the interpretation of Barth’s understanding of the Christian 
as witness might help to explain how Christians can persist in engaging in acts of witness 
in spite of the presence of sin in human reality.  
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Chapter 4  
4 Conclusion: Towards a “Hopeful” Reading of Christian 
Witness in Barth’s Theology 
By way of a constructive conclusion to this thesis, in this chapter I will draw out some 
implications of the theme of hope in Barth’s doctrine of reconciliation for his account of 
vocation and witness. I will provisionally indicate some of the fruitful directions in which 
interpretations of this account, oriented by the theme of hope, might lead in future 
scholarship on this topic.  
To introduce the way that Barth’s discussion of hope relates to his treatment of Christian 
witness, we can refer once again to the triadic structure of Barth’s doctrine of 
reconciliation, as laid out in table 1 in the first chapter of this thesis. Barth’s section “The 
Holy Spirit and Christian Hope” corresponds to the last section of each of the other parts 
of the doctrine of reconciliation. Part one’s corresponding section is “The Holy Spirit and 
Christian Faith,” and part two’s corresponding section is “The Holy Spirit and Christian 
Love.” These concluding sections describe, as Webster puts it, “the Spirit’s work in the 
individual believer”281 and they follow descriptions of the Spirit’s work in the Christian 
community.  
These descriptions of both the communal and individual aspects of the Spirit’s work are 
connected to different effects of the Christ-event on “the renewal of human life”282 – 
justification, sanctification, and vocation. Although the Christian community’s task as 
witness is enormously important in Barth’s theology, and clearly moreso than the 
individual’s, this thesis has, for reasons of scope, focused less upon the ecclesial 
dimension and more upon the individual Christian as witness. Likewise, in emphasizing 
and developing the theme of hope, which is obviously not irrelevant for the community 
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as a whole, our aim is to provide a corrective to readings of Barth’s theology of the 
individual Christian witness that ignore the importance of hope.  
4.1 The Human “How” in Relation to the Human “What” 
One of the insights it is possible to glean from how the section on hope fits into the 
broader structure of the doctrine of reconciliation, is its “function” or relationship to the 
other sections on the Holy Spirit’s work in the individual Christian’s life. Barth describes 
Christ’s work as mediator (in his prophetic office) as “the How of the event in its 
inalienable distinction from the What,”283 the “What” here referring to Christ’s work as 
Son of God (in his priestly office) and Son of Man (in his kingly office).  
By analogy, we can see a similar relationship between the Spirit’s work of hope and the 
Spirit’s work of faith and love. Barth writes, “The question [at the end of] the third part 
[of the doctrine of reconciliation] is how it is actually possible for the man who is called 
to be a witness of Jesus Christ in and with His community, […] to serve the Word of God 
in the world and in his own small way to exist prophetically in the school and 
discipleship of the one great Prophet.”284 
The “how” articulated through this discussion of hope is at once contrasted with and 
related to the “what” of faith and love. Barth writes,  
There can be no doubt as to [the] foundation [of the existence of the 
Christian], since the Christian derives securely from the resurrection of 
Jesus Christ. Nor can there be any doubt as to its present constitution and 
the step which the Christian has to take at the moment, since every action 
may be performed within the sphere of the lordship of the Holy Spirit. 
What was and is deeply open to question is the manner and measure of 
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faith, obedience and love, in short, of the gratitude with which the 
Christian has thus far responded and even yet responds to grace.285  
This passage reflects, in microcosm, the structure of Barth’s whole doctrine of 
reconciliation. It summarizes the doctrine of reconciliation in such a way that it casts the 
whole doctrine in the light of the third part-volume, bringing out its implications for the 
“here and now” in light of the “there and then,” particularly for the life of the Christian 
individual.   
In the above-cited passage, the foundation of Christian existence deriving from Christ’s 
resurrection is the objective ground of reconciliation in Christ’s reconciling acts, which 
Barth discusses in the first section of each of the three part-volumes of the doctrine of 
reconciliation. By referring to the resurrection of Jesus Christ as that from which 
Christian existence “securely derives,” Barth emphasizes how reconciliation is not 
trapped by its character as past history but rather continues to have impact because Jesus 
Christ still lives and acts as this one in the present time. This derivation of Christian 
existence from Jesus Christ’s resurrection is out of the grasp of human manipulation. 
Humans do not have the power to make themselves Christians. Any claim to such power 
would be “insecure,” rather than securely deriving from the resurrection.  
The “present constitution” and “the step which the Christian has to take at the moment,” 
can be interpreted as referring to faith, and love or “love and obedience” respectively. 
Note that it is not my purpose, in making these fine distinctions, to suggest that faith, 
love, and hope are radically different from one another, nor to become so enmeshed in 
the details as to forget how Barth’s theology works as a whole. Rather, I follow Barth’s 
lead here. He writes, “[H]ope in its distinction from faith and love as resolute look ahead 
constitutes, a particular dimension of Christian existence without which there can be no 
solidity in faith and love even though they are not identical with it. Any identification 
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would entail an impoverishment of the understanding of Christian existence and indeed 
its christological foundation.”286   
Faith is the “present constitution” of Christian existence. With respect to the event 
character of truth, discussed in chapter 3, faith can be understood as the capacity for 
human reception of truth, both bestowed and revealed only in this event of encounter 
with Jesus Christ. Barth writes, “[Faith] constitutes the Christian. In believing, the 
Christian owes everything to the object of his faith, the incomprehensible fact that he 
may not only be in relation to this object, but may be active in this being.”287 Love is “the 
step [of obedience] which the Christian has to take at the moment” as the outworking in 
Christian life of sanctification, secured in and with justification in Christ’s resurrection. 
Barth writes, “Love as self-giving stands contrasted with faith as reception. […] What we 
have here – in Christian love – is a movement in which a man turns away from himself 
[…and] turns wholly to another.”288 As the active response to and of faith, love may be 
understood as the act of witness.  
With respect to faith and love, reception and response, hope gives us a way to talk about 
the “manner and measure” of these things, the “How” in relation to the “What.” In his 
discussion of hope, Barth brings up the issues of “possibility” and “reality” 289 – two 
words that were central to the problems in Barth’s depiction of human life and action, 
discussed in chapter 3. The role of hope in clarifying the reality and possibility of faith 
and love might be summarized as giving them a temporal orientation, and thus orienting 
Christian life in witness by eschatology.  
4.2 Eschatology and the Future-Orientation of Hope 
In chapter 3, we saw how in Barth’s theology the reality of sin impedes Christian witness. 
We asked why Barth would not start theological reflection from the clear presence of sin 
                                                
286
 Ibid., 225.  
287
 Barth, Church Dogmatics, IV/1, bk. 23: 231. 
288
 Barth, Church Dogmatics, IV/2, bk. 26: 121-123. 
289
 Barth, Church Dogmatics, IV/3.2, bk. 29: 216-217. 
79 
 
in the world and we concluded that Barth understands the Word of God to speak louder 
than sin’s reality. This Word, spoken by the risen Jesus Christ, relegates sin’s power to 
“nothingness.” In his discussion of hope, Barth does allow his focus to shift momentarily 
to the lived experience of sin relative to the lived experience of the already accomplished 
reconciliation in Christ. He writes, “[…] the prophetic action of Jesus Christ, […] while it 
is complete in itself, is only moving towards it fulfillment […]. For He has not yet spoken 
universally of Himself and the act of reconciliation accomplished in him. […] And it is 
this Not Yet which is at a first glance the most striking determination of the time in which 
the Christian now exists on the basis of his vocation to be a witness of Jesus Christ in the 
context of the sending of His community.”290 Importantly, in the passage above, the Not 
Yet of the fulfillment of Christ’s prophetic action does not signal the Not Yet of 
reconciliation’s accomplishment. This was explained in Chapter 1’s discussion of 
parousia and the different forms of Christ’s coming again. Barth’s suggestion that the 
Not Yet of Jesus Christ’s universal self-declaration is the most obvious characteristic of 
the time in which we live has several implications, and the relationship of hope to these 
implications is what, I suggest, might orient future readings of Barth’s theology of 
witness.  
The first and most important implication of the Christian’s living primarily under the 
determination of this Not Yet is that, secondarily, the Christian lives under the 
determination of an Already, and therefore in the expectation of a complete fulfillment of 
Christ’s Word in the future. Barth writes, “It is not really true, of course, that this time of 
ours is primarily and decisively determined by this Not Yet […]. Primarily and decisively 
it is positively determined by that which Jesus Christ already is and means in it.”291 In 
Barth’s view, the Christian can assert that the Word of God in Christ is louder than its 
relatively unapparent inoperativeness in the world.292  
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The Christian can make this assertion, however, only on the basis of the ways in which 
Christ is actively working in the world. Thus, Barth’s theology of witness and, in fact, his 
theology more generally, is characterized by a certain stripe of realism. As John Webster 
explains, “Barth’s realism is of a very distinct kind, because of the reality to which it is 
oriented, the self-revealing God. [He insists] Christian faith and theology is rooted in a 
conviction that the reality by which they are encountered and to which they are a 
response […] – is reality.”293 Furthermore, Barth expects that it is the world in which 
humans are now living that is both encountered by this reality, and in which the 
declaration of Christ’s reconciliation is to be fully and concretely realized.  
In this expectation, Barth distinguishes himself, on the one hand, from those whose hope 
lies in an ultimate sphere, disconnected from this penultimate sphere,294 and on the other 
hand, from those who would “flatten out” the meaning of eschatology to “cover and 
explain the transcendent character of all subjects and contents of theological 
discussion,”295 thus eliminating the important dimension of time. Barth understands the 
latter as a relatively useless development that, more importantly, does not reflect the 
Biblical understanding of eschatology.296 With respect to the former, Barth agrees that 
we are living in the penultimate time but rejects the view that this penultimate time is 
void of manifestations of Jesus Christ’s truth and, therefore, Christian witness to it.297 
For, “[If] Jesus Christ is the goal and end of time, then necessarily this time as such with 
all its contents, thought it is not yet the day of redemption, is at least partly determined by 
the fact that it moves towards this as its end and goal.”298 Resignation in face of this 
world and this time, in favour of hope only in the next, Barth says, risks leading to the 
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belief that Christian action is meaningless. 299 Barth’s identification of this risk indicates, 
against some of his critics, that Barth himself sees Christian action as meaningful.  
The event character of truth, discussed at length in chapter 3, and its relationship to the 
continuity experienced in human subjectivity, are a result of Barth’s understanding of 
eschatology as already occurring but not yet fulfilled, and also as “real” in the sense 
described above. Because Jesus Christ, in the power of the Holy Spirit does really 
encounter people, calling them to an active knowledge of himself, the event of grace as 
truth does really interrupt the Christian’s subjective experience.  
However, Jesus Christ “has not yet spoken universally of Himself and the act of 
reconciliation accomplished in Him […] in such away that even those who are awakened 
by Him to faith and love can hear His voice […] to the exclusion of every conceivable 
contradiction and opposition and above all participation in human falsehood.”300 From 
the subjective side, therefore, one’s certainty of one’s own witness is discontinuous; it is 
“a twofold, ambivalent, equivocal future dominated by […] a future which is both bright 
and dark and which he can await either with calm and confidence or with uncertainty, 
doubt, anxiety, depression and even despair[.]”301  
Without the added dimension of hope, which suggests this subjective vacillation will 
come to an end in the fulfillment of Christ’s revelation, the uncertainty of Christian 
experience cannot undergird sustained Christian witness. Barth suggests real Christian 
hope “forbids” this twofold, ambivalent expectation of the future.302 Yet, given the 
purported ubiquity of falsehood, and especially its tendency to masquerade as truth in 
Christian life, it would make little sense for Barth to suggest that hope somehow manages 
to evade falsehood’s corruption.  
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Indeed, Barth does not suggest that hope is somehow immune to human falsehood; 
rather, “it is in all the dubiety and frailty of his existence […] that [the Christian] has to 
hope as well as to believe and love. The veil is not taken away.”303 To make sense of the 
apparent contradiction between the Christian hope that forbids uncertainty and the 
Christian falsehood that guarantees it, we must understand how Barth’s continued 
contrast between objectively determined reality and subjectively experienced reality 
plays out in this dimension of hope. 
In chapter 3, I suggested that scholars of Barth work tend to defend his portrayal of 
human reality and human agency by showing that he redefines the use of such terms by 
his understanding of Christ’s ontologically determinative reality. This redefinition does 
not eclipse “reality” or “agency” as they are commonly understood, but rather views them 
as taken up into the supreme reality of Jesus Christ and given their proper definition. The 
same idea can be applied to Barth’s concept of hope.  
Barth contrasts human hope as “a matter of expecting that things will turn out better”304 
with real Christian hope as “unambiguous, uninterrupted, unilateral and therefore 
absolutely positive expectation of the future, because expectation of Jesus Christ and 
therefore hope in God and His salvation.”305 It is not, therefore, hope in general or hope 
as it is commonly understood that allows the Christian to witness confidently in face of 
the human situation; it is hope redefined by reference to its ontological reality in Jesus 
Christ.  
By defining real Christian hope with reference to Christ, Barth is not suggesting that 
Christians will always only ever experience this type of hope. As emphasized, in Barth’s 
view, all human experience occurs under the veil of falsehood. Here, an appreciation for 
Barth’s realism is critical to understanding his point. For Barth, “real Christian hope” is 
the objective hope already secured in Christ that – in the event of grace as truth – meets 
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the Christian in his subjectivity, and at once discloses itself and the falsehood of the 
Christian’s attempts at hope. In his own words, Barth says “As Jesus Christ Himself is 
objectively his hope, it is infallibly guaranteed that his witness to Him as witness of 
subjective hope in Him will actually be possible and real tomorrow no less than today 
[…].”306 Therefore, because the unsteady subjective hope of the Christian participates in 
the objective hope of Christ, Christian witness can proceed without the type of guarantees 
and clear outlines that falsehood seeks.  
Subjective hope that is conditioned by and participates in objective hope, according to 
Barth, is active hope – and not just because it ought to be, but moreover because it can 
be, in its freedom. Where Christians in their falsehood try to get a hold on what witness is 
‘supposed’ to be, they are wrested by “idle contemplation.”307 They try to look for 
guarantees and answers where they cannot be found. By contrast, real hope “takes place 
in the act of taking the next step. Hope is action, and as such it is genuine hope.”308 Real 
hope can only be hope in action because it is only in real events that Jesus Christ 
transforms the world already reconciled to God in Him, and does so in fellowship with 
humanity. These hopeful acts of Christian witness proceed in spite of the falsehood 
inherent to the subjectivity of the human agents from whom they proceed.  
In light of Christian faith in the reality of world reconciled in Christ, and in hopeful 
anticipation of its full revelation in real time, Christians can and must venture to act as 
witnesses to this revelation. Barth writes, “The great and critical moments [in history…] 
were and are those in which there may be […] in the power of the Holy Spirit, certain 
provisional discoveries – preceding and intimating the final revelation of Jesus Christ – 
of the glorious, unsettling yet deeply consoling fact that even in its supreme form 
falsehood is only falsehood, and that its deceptive appearance of truth is very far from 
speaking the truth.”309 These provisional intimations are “discoveries,” not because they 
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were brought about by the Holy Spirit in abstraction from human acts, but because there 
are no guarantees in human action itself. It is only in the Holy Spirit’s ongoing eventful 
revelation that human acts are shown to correspond with Christ’s self-witness, and are 
thus “discovered” as provisional intimations.  
Barth is reluctant to outline in any detail the form these provisional intimations might 
take. This is unsurprising given that the entire thrust of his theology of witness relies on 
the freedom and sovereignty of God’s action, and human action as responsive to God’s 
action. Nevertheless, Barth does sketch out “certain elements which generally 
characterize Christian life and action,”310 even though he does not spell out the details of 
this life and action. First, Barth suggests that Christian life and action is not geared 
towards “private ends,” given that the Gospel of Jesus Christ is the reconciliation of the 
whole world and not just the reconciliation of the person whom he encounters. 
Consequently, the individual Christian witnesses in and with the witness of the whole 
Christian community, in the service of the public at large.311 Secondly, and this was 
mentioned above, the Christian witness acts in expectation that reconciliation of the 
whole world is not only future but is also present, and so the Christian cannot be resigned 
in the face of the present time.312 Lastly, Barth suggests that Christians must surrender 
their acts of witness to the will of God. Barth writes that because witness “derives from 
God,” rather than oneself, “[the Christian] need not care whether or not he is worthy of 
such a life or able to achieve it. It means he need not care whether or not […] he might 
slip back into all kinds of non-Christian, ambivalent and therefore despairing, self-
seeking, abstractly other-worldly or this-worldly expectations of the future.”313 The 
Christian, rather, can act in hope based on the confidence that the God who called him to 
this life will continue to do so.314   
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